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INTANGIBLE OR EMBODIED INFORMATION:
THE NON-STATUTORY NATURE OF HUMAN
GENETIC MATERIAL
Debra Greenfieldt
Abstract
Although scientists, social scientists, and historians since the
early 1950s have described deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) sequences
as information, this characterization has yet to be recognized by the
law of intellectual property. However, a prestigious body of national
policy-makers recently acknowledged that the nature of genomic
discoveries could be considered information distinct from the tangible
molecules from which it is derived. The implications of this
characterization for patent law suggest that recent decisions dealing
with the statutory subject matter of computer-implemented inventions
could prove more relevant than prior cases regarding patents granted
to discoveries in the life sciences. The following Article expands upon
this suggestion. Examining the science of DNA, including the
technical processes of DNA isolation and purification, as well as the
language of specific patent claims, establishes that these claims are
being made purely for their informational content, as either
intangible information per se, or by regarding DNA as information
embodied as a molecular structure. Thus characterized, analogous
cases dealing with computer technology, including recent decisions
from the Federal Circuit, provide the argument that DNA sequences
represent exceptions to patentable subject matter as laws of nature
and can be viewed as falling outside the enumerated categories of
statutory subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101.
t Debra Greenfield, M.A., J.D., is a postdoctoral fellow with the UCLA Center for
Society and Genetics, who supported the writing of this article. The author would like to thank
her faculty sponsors, Dr. Wayne Grody and Professor Russell Korobkin for their generous help,
as well as Professor Lori. B. Andrews (Chicago-Kent School of Law) for her continued
enthusiasm and encouragement, and Sara Burton (Pepperdine University Law) for her technical
assistance.
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INTRODUCTION
While intellectual property law has not treated it as such,
academic discourse has situated human genetic material,
deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) and DNA sequences, within a
conceptual framework that characterizes its inherent nature as
information. In Who Wrote the Book of Life? A History of the Genetic
Code, historian Lily E. Kay discusses the history of work on the
genetic code within the rise of communication techno-science such as
cybernetics, information theory and computers, as well as the history
of life science, and traces its beginnings to the early 1950s (the dawn
of the information age).' Describing the workings of DNA and protein
synthesis as information flow, Francis Crick's work, according to
Kay, "encapsulated the ideology and experimental mandate of
molecular genetics: genetic information, qua DNA, was both the
origin and universal agent of all life.",2 This information discourse
established a new context, a language for human genes where life's
messages constitute a text written in codes.3
Decades later, following the advent of the Human Genome
Project, social scientists similarly described, analyzed, and
characterized the nature and value of genomic discoveries as,
implicitly, information separate from its biological and material
source.4 Similar to the operations of a computer network, within the
system of a human organism, genes transmit data through processes
of coding and encoding.5 What has come to be known as
bioinformatics suggests that fundamentally, not only does DNA act
like information; a molecule of DNA is simply embodied or
materialized information. 6 Social, economic, ethical, and political
implications arise from such a characterization: genetic information,
i.e., a DNA sequence, independent of its material source, becomes a
product of global mercantile exchange.7 Once removed from the
1. LILY E. KAY, WHO WROTE THE BOOK OF LIFE? A HISTORY OF THE GENETIC CODE, at
xv (2000).
2. Id. at 174-75.
3. Id. at 72.
4. See infra notes 6-7 and accompanying text.
5. See infra notes 136-142 and accompanying text.
6. EUGENE THACKER, THE GLOBAL GENOME: BIOTECHNOLOGY, POLITICS, AND
CULTURE 8-9 (2005) [hereinafter GLOBAL GENOME]. See also Eugene Thacker, Database/Body:
Bioinformatics, Biopolitics, and Totally Connected Media Systems, SWITCH, Jan. 20, 2000,
available at http://switch.sjsu.edu/nextswitch/switch-engine/front/front.php?artc=243.
7. KAUSHIK SUNDER RAJAN, BIOCAPITAL: THE CONSTITUTION OF POSTGENOMIC LIFE
42 (2006).
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control of the human body and populations, a DNA sequence
regarded as pure information establishes a new hierarchy: whoever
controls this intellectual product, the bio-power of the genome,
assumes a new control over life.8
The perception, characterization, and recognition of the
implications of DNA as information was similarly recognized by a
prestigious body of this nations' policy-makers and scientists in a
2006 report published by the Committees of the National Academies,
Reaping the Benefits of Genomic and Proteomic Research:
Intellectual Property Rights, Innovation, and Public Health (Report).9
Its preface spoke of the need to avoid conflicts between the rights of
an inventor and open access to newly-identified genetic information,
as well as a need to assess whether appropriate mechanisms were in
place to prevent such conflicts.'
0
In examining these mechanisms, the authors described a history
of the patenting of human genetic material, suggesting a major
transformation in how the nature of the subject matter of these patents
was, and is, being perceived evolving from biological materials to
pure information.'" In the 1970s, patents were granted for "isolated
and purified" DNA sequences encoding naturally-occurring amino
acid sequences. 12 "[T]he courts and the United States Patent and
Trademark Office (USPTO) treated these inventions as chemicals or
'compositions of matter."",13  Based upon this precedent,
biotechnology firms in the 1980s secured numerous patents on genes
that encoded therapeutic proteins, thus securing "exclusive
franchises" for their manufacture.14 However, the Report noted that in
the 1990s, "the development of new tools and techniques for
detecting genetic differences among individuals enabled researchers
to bypass the stages of protein isolation and characterization and to
identify directly the genes associated with diseases (or disease
8. KAY, supra note 1, at 327.
9. See REAPING THE BENEFITS OF GENOMIC AND PROTEOMIC RESEARCH:
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS, INNOVATION, AND PUBLIC HEALTH (Stephan A. Merril &
Anne-Marie Mazza eds., 2006) [hereinafter Report], available at
http://www.nap.edu/catalog.php?recordid= 11487.
10. Id. at ix.
11. Id. at 73.
12. Id at 71.
13. Report, supra note 9, at 71 (quoting Amgen, Inc. v. Chugai Pharm. Co., 927 F.2d
1200, 1206 (Fed. Cir. 1991) for the proposition that "[a] gene is a chemical compound, albeit a
complex one").
14. Id. at 71.
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susceptibilities) through positional cloning."' 5 The authors noted that
bypassing the process of protein isolation rendered the genes useful
both as research tools and diagnostics.
16
The Report described how the advent of high-throughput DNA
sequencing allowed for the automatic identification of expressed
sequences, which led to the practice of patenting these sequences
without patenting the corresponding protein or its function.' 7 These
sequences, known as ESTs (Expressed Sequence Tags) are critical
research tools' 8:
Because the sequence information contained in an EST is enough
to distinguish one gene from all others, each EST may be used to
identify the chromosomal location of its corresponding gene. The
ability to locate where a particular gene is located on a
chromosome is important in the detection of chromosomal
mutations and corresponding disease states.
1 9
The ability to locate a particular gene on a chromosome assists in the
detection of chromosomal mutations and corresponding disease states
when the EST is compared to underlying genomic sequence
information (or mapping data, e.g., a genetic marker) to which the
sequence of the EST can be compared.
By 1999, the practice of patenting these sequences invoked
concerns, and the USPTO responded by requiring that a practical and
substantial utility of the DNA sequence be demonstrated. 20 As
discussed by then National Institute of Health (NIH) Director, Harold
Varmus, and the National Human Genome Research Institute
Director, Francis Collins, a patent requires more than a theoretical
function of the protein as the sole basis of the pronounced utility.2 '
The Report notes that "[t]he first patent filings on the results of high-
throughput DNA sequencing coincided with a broader trend in the
biomedical research community to claim intellectual property rights
in research tools and to assert these rights against academic
researchers.
'
"
22
15. Id. at 71-72 (citing Francis S. Collins, Positional Cloning Moves from Perditional to
Traditional, 9 NATURE GENETICs 347,347-50 (1995)).
16. Id. at 72.
17. See id. at 52.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Report, supra note 9, at 52-53.
21. Id. at 53 (citing Correspondence from Harold Varmus, Director, NIH, and Francis
Collins, NIHGR, to Q. Todd Dickinson, USPTO (Dec. 21, 1999).
22. Id. at 73 (citation omitted).
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This controversy regarding the patenting of ESTs as research
tools emphasized the nature of genomic discoveries as information,
distinct from their previous characterization as tangible molecules.
2 3
Despite the technological advances and changes in how this
information is and was identified, it is arguable that the Report
recognizes that patent claims on DNA sequences, Single Nucleotide
Polymorphisms (SNPs) and complimentary DNA sequences (cDNA)
have consistently been motivated by and made on this separate
informational content distinguished from its biological and material
identity.
24
This recognition is particularly significant. Joining the social
scientists and philosophers, scientists, engineers, biomedical
researchers, and policy-makers have come to recognize that claims to
DNA sequences can be perceived and characterized as intangible
information, separate and thus distinguishable from the tangible
molecule in which it is contained. DNA sequences can also be
described or characterized as information which has materialized or is
embodied as a molecular structure.25 Simply, when considering the
23. Id. at 73.
24. See supra notes 9-22 and accompanying text regarding an explanation of the various
types of claimed DNA sequences.
25. See Dan Burk, The Problem of Process in Biotechnology, 43 HOUS. L. REV. 561, 582-
87 (2006). Dan Burk finds the description of DNA sequences as simply "information" too
simplistic; rather he describes the patented molecules as "channels for informational transfer
processes." Id. at 563. Instead of the DNA in isolation, "[ilt rather functions within an
interactive structural apparatus that as a whole forms an information transfer system." Id. at 583.
DNA physically interacts with "other structure mechanisms, and ... is essentially inoperative
outside its functional matrix." Id. at 583. In this functional matrix, "information is encoded in
the architecture or structure of molecules." Id. at 585. Information flow within a cell occurs via
the interaction of particular configurations of molecular structure with complementary
configurations of molecular structures.
Biological molecules interact and encode information not only via the spatial
exclusions of their molecular form-which is to say, the spaces occupied by their
repulsive electron shells-but also via the extended secondary, tertiary and
quaternary structures formed by the macromolecular chains, the clustered arrays
of water molecules surrounding these macromolecules, the clouds of charged
ions that macromolecules draw in their wake. These interlocking physical
structures are the .. . "channels" by which information is conveyed from
molecule to molecule. . . .[l]n biotechnology the medium is quite literally, the
message.
Id. at 585-86. So, sequences are merely the shorthand for a set of spatial relationships, it's not
the string, but the "three-dimensional configuration of the molecule" that encodes the
information. The implication for patenting is that the information is only useful when embodied
in such structures, which is to say that, ultimately, no one is
interested in strings of human-readable letters-they are instead interested in what
can be done with the structures the letters represent. And that in turn means that
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nature and character of human DNA, "the medium is... the
message." 6 Despite this recognition and the growing literature
devoted to the implications of human genetic material as information,
intellectual property law to date has not treated it as such, but
continues to allow the privatization of human genetic material in the
form of patents based upon a limited and archaic definitional
understanding of DNA sequences as simply biological "wet"
material. : s
The legality of patents issued on DNA sequences should be
analyzed within the context of the nature and characterization of what
is actually being claimed. The legitimization by the scientific
community and policy-makers of human genetic material as
constituting information suggests a possible new paradigm for
considering the legality of such patents and specifically whether such
claims are directed to patentable subject matter under 35 U.S.C § 101.
While the original precedent establishing the statutory subject
matter of patents granted to DNA molecules based upon the concept
of their having been "isolated and purified" is equally questionable,28
the characterization of genetic sequences as information provides a
legal argument for the premise that DNA sequences represent the
express limitations on 35 U.S.C. § 101 subject matter as defined and
described by the Court and followed by the lower courts.2 9 The
following Article attempts to delineate why, when DNA sequences
are characterized and perceived as information and informational
content distinguishable from the tangible molecule in which they are
contained, they constitute non-statutory subject matter for which a
by necessity they must be interested in building informational structures-the
molecules that are the conduit for information transfer.
Id. at 586-87 (second emphasis added). Thus, "it is the information flow that is of interest in
biotechnology, and hence of interest in biotechnology patenting." ld. at 587 (emphasis omitted).
26. Id. at 586 n.127 (citing MARSHALL MCLUHAN, UNDERSTANDING MEDIA: THE
EXTENSIONS OF MAN 7 (1964)).
27. See, e.g., supra note 13.
28. There are various arguments questioning the patentability of DNA and DNA
sequences which are outside the scope of this article. For example, commentators have argued
that DNA and DNA molecules are non-statutory, excluded from § 101 suitability as "Products
of Nature." Despite the processes known as "isolation and purification," the molecules are
essentially identical to those found in nature and thus non-statutory according to the law. See,
e.g., Linda J. Demaine & Aaron Xavier Fellmeth, Reinventing the Double Helix: A Novel and
Nonobvious Reconceptualization of the Biotechnology Patent, 55 STAN. L. REV. 303, 400, 461-
62 (2002); John Conley & Robert Makowski, Going Back to Square One: Biotechnology
Patents and the Products of Nature Doctrine, 13 INFO. & COMM. TECH. L. 3, 8-11 (2004).
29. See, e.g., infra, notes 102-120 and accompanying text; notes 145-199 and
accompanying text; notes 275-457 and accompanying text.
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patent cannot be granted. Instead, DNA sequences, as information,
exemplify the exact limitation upon subject matter the Court has
defined as comprising laws of nature as well as falling outside the
statutory categories of patent eligible subject matter.3 °
In delineating this argument, Part I discusses the law, science,
and language involved in patent claims on DNA sequences. Although
the USPTO Utility Examination Guidelines state that DNA sequences
are eligible for a patent when "isolated from their natural state and
purified, and when the application meets the statutory criteria for
patentability, ' 3 1 an examination of the biological properties of DNA
and the processes of "isolation and purification" reveals that the
nature of what is being claimed, i.e., the resultant information, is
identical whether occurring in its natural state, or having been
identified, isolated, purified, or replicated by complex technological
achievement. Additionally, examining the specific types of claims
directed to human genetic material, and the contexts in which they are
framed, further reiterates how such claims are essentially directed to
the informational content of human genetic material.
Part II will discuss how, in light of the science previously
discussed, human DNA gene sequences and fragments, human DNA
gene sequences used to detect specific mutations, and human DNA
sequences with single nucleotide polymorphisms (SNPs), are not
statutory subject matter. This section will examine the seminal
O'Reilly v. Morse32 case, invalidating patent claims for the underlying
principle of electromagnetism that exemplified the laws of nature
doctrine.3 3 Similarly, whether or not they have been identified,
isolated, purified, or replicated as cDNA, the intangible or embodied
information of DNA sequences is a manifestation of a law of nature, a
numerical arrangement, a formula, an expression of an idea, a pre-
existent scientific truth or principle, and ultimately a research tool,
and thus excluded from the categories of statutory subject matter.
Part II Section A will establish how patent claims to identified,
isolated, and purified DNA and DNA sequences, fragments, SNPs, or
replicated cDNA are simply a representation of an arrangement of
base pairs, and that these claims are precisely directed to the
30. See 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2000) ("Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful
process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement
thereof. may obtain a patent therefor, subject to the conditions and requirements of this title.").
31. Utility Examination Guidelines, 66 Fed. Reg. 1092, 1093 (Jan. 5, 2001).
32. O'Reilly v. Morse, 56 U.S. (15 How.) 62 (1853).
33. Id. at 112-18.
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informational content of the genetic sequence.34 A recent decision
from the Federal Circuit examining how a claim for a signal should be
construed provides a strong rationale that patent claims to genetic
material can similarly be construed as claiming the informational
content.3 5 Thus, these claims are not directed to statutory subject
matter.
Section B of Part II establishes why DNA sequences, whether
occurring naturally or having been identified, isolated and purified, or
replicated, are information expressing a pre-existing scientific
principle which, when patented, either pre-empts the scientific
principle itself or is not new. Thus, the information should be
considered a law of nature, an exception to statutory subject matter.
Analogies are drawn between "the informational processing"
system implemented by the activity of human DNA genetic sequences
and the workings involved in computer technology systems.36 In fact,
in characterizing DNA sequences as information, distinguished from
its material source, the National Academy Report further suggests that
if these claims are directed purely to the informational content, the
use of which would be an infringement, then recent decisions dealing
with the subject matter of computer-implemented inventions would
prove more relevant than prior decisions regarding patents on genetic
discoveries.37
Illustrative of these cases are the Supreme Court's decisions in
Gottschalk v. Benson38 and Parker v. Flook,39 as well as the Federal
Circuit's decision in In re Warmerdam.40 Considering the underlying
principles involved in computer technologies, these cases regard
mathematical algorithms as laws of nature exceptions to patentable
subject matter if they either wholly pre-empt the algorithm or are not
new (novel) but merely previously unknown. This section describes
how, analogous to these algorithms, the discrete units of information
of DNA sequences that encode the arrangement of amino acids
comprising individual proteins are similarly laws of nature and pre-
existing scientific principles which, if patented, wholly pre-empt their
use.
34. See, e.g., In re Nuijten, 500 F.3d 1346, 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (discussing the
patenting of the information contained in a signal).
35. Id.
36. See infra notes 140-145 and accompanying text.
37. See Report, supra note 9, at 76-77.
38. Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67, 71-73 (1972).
39. Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 589, 593-94 (1978).
40. In re Warmerdam, 33 F.3d 1354, 1358-59 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
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Section C of Part II proceeds to specifically examine the analogy
of the computer technology cases to establish that claims to identified,
isolated, and purified DNA sequences, SNPs, and cDNA are not
statutory subject matter as the processes involved in their creation do
not transform the retrieved information into something other than the
information originally existing in their natural environment. The
Court in Diamond v. Diehr4t distinguished its previous cases
regarding the statutory nature of algorithms.42  When these
mathematical principles were applied by a process in such a way that
an article was either transformed or reduced to a different state, they
became suitable subject matter for the grant of the patent.43 Thus,
lower courts expanded the patentability of algorithms embedded
within process claims, but only when the process had a transformative
result.44 Where claimed inventions did not have a transformative
effect, they were found to be non-statutory subject matter.45
Examining claims to the information of human genetic material
establishes that this information, like a formula or numerical
expression, has also not been transformed by the process of its
identification, isolation, purification, or replication, and thus should
not be considered statutory subject matter.
Part III of this article argues that claims directed to DNA
sequences, construed as information, are non-statutory subject matter
as they do not fall within an enumerated category: it is neither a
process, machine, manufacture, nor composition of matter analogous
46to a claimed signal at issue in a recent Federal Circuit case. Section
A of Part III argues that the sequential information of human genetic
material is analogous to cases involving the patentability of
inventions considered within the "printed matter" doctrine. The
doctrine involves a line of cases determining that an arrangement of
printed matter, commonly, words or images on paper, is non-
statutory.4 7 In the computer age, the doctrine's rules similarly apply to
information recorded in different substrates or mediums.
48
Section B of Part III considers one type of claim important for
the present and future of medical research and healthcare. This section
41. Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175 (1981).
42. Id. at 186-87.
43. Id. at 187.
44. See infra notes 209-241 and accompanying text.
45. See, e.g., In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 965-66 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
46. See In re Nuijten, 500 F.3d 1346, 1353, 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
47. See DONALD S. CHISUM, I CHISUM ON PATENTS § 1.02[4][c] (2008).
48. Id. at § 1.02 [4][c][ii], [4][e].
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concludes that claims to methods and materials for determining a
relationship between a particular DNA sequence and the presence or
absence of susceptibility to a disease are non-statutory mental steps or
mental processes. The Court has held that "mental processes ... are
not patentable, as they are the basic tools of scientific and
technological work. ' 49 A recent Federal Circuit case concerning a
claim directed to a business method reiterated the concept and
described mental processes and steps as including a list of descriptive
mental terms, such as "determining," "comparing," and "observing.
50
A claim to the information of a specific DNA sequence, which
correlates to the existence or absence of genetic susceptibility to a
disease or other medical condition is similarly a claim to such a
mental act and should be considered non-statutory subject matter.
Section IV considers recent developments in case law and
USPTO practices which suggest that the patentability of the
information of "isolated and purified" DNA sequences could and
should be reconsidered. Although the case was not decided based on
procedural grounds, the Court's consideration of the question of
statutory subject matter in Laboratory Corp. v. Metabolite, Inc.,51 the
recent Federal Circuit cases of In re Nuiten,5 2 In re Comiskey,53 and
In re Bilski,54 as well as the Patent Office's clarification regarding the
statutory nature of processes, all suggest a potential narrowing of the
scope of patentable subject manner.55 This development could have
similar implications when considering the patentability of the
intangible or embodied information of human DNA sequences under
35 U.S.C. § 101.
The Conclusion summarizes how the legality of patents on
human genetic material could be challenged on this specific legal
ground. When regarded as information, DNA sequences constitute
non-statutory subject matter. Nevertheless, because of the confines of
patent law, challenges to these patents are difficult and limited to
infringers. Because they may also hold patents, it is arguable that
potential plaintiffs will be reluctant to question the legality of the
49. Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67 (1972).
50. In re Comiskey, 554 F.3d 967, 979-81 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
51. Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings v. Metabolite Lab., Inc., 548 U.S. 124, 126-27 (2006)
(Breyer, J., dissenting).
52. In re Nuijten, 500 F.3d 1346, 1352, 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
53. Comiskey, 554 F.3d at 980.
54. In re Bilski, 545 F. 3d 943, 966 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
55. See Memorandum from John Love, Deputy Commissioner for Patent Examination
Policy, to Technology Center Directors (May 15, 2008) (on file with author).
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subject matter of a patent on the informational content of DNA and
DNA sequences. This section also argues that the continued practice
of patenting the informational content of human genetic material has
possible Constitutional implications, as well as social, ethical, and
policy concerns put forth by social scientists and philosophers who
recognize that DNA is, in essence, information.
I. THE LAW, SCIENCE, AND LANGUAGE OF PATENTS ON HUMAN
GENETIC INFORMATION
The United States Constitution grants Congress broad power to
create laws in order "to promote the Progress of Science and useful
Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the
exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries. 56 These
Congressional statutes are codified in the 1952 Patent Act, found in
Title 35 of the United States Code, which includes various sections
describing the requirements for obtaining patent protection.57 The
USPTO is the Department of Commerce's patent-issuing agency.58 In
addition to issuing patents, the USPTO administers patent laws
through its Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences (Board).59
Actions regarding patent infringement are heard by federal district
courts, appeals of which are reviewed by the Federal Circuit Court of
Appeals.6 °
The focus of this Article is § 101 of Title 35, which specifies and
defines the subject matter for which patents may be obtained. Under §
101, a person who "invents or discovers any new and useful process,
machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and
useful improvement thereof, may obtain a patent therefore, subject to
the conditions and requirements of this title."6' Courts have
interpreted the nature of patentable subject matter, delineating
exceptions to the section's general definition as well as clarifying the
designated statutory categories.
The § 101 descriptions, "new and useful," have traditionally
been distinguished by courts defining patentable subject matter from
specific requirements regarding an invention's "utility" according to §
56. U.S.CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 8.
57. See 35 U.S.C. ch. 10 (2000).
58. USPTO, General Information Concerning Patents: Functions of the United States
Patent and Trademark Office, http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/pac/doc/general/index.html
(last visited Feb. 15, 2009).
59. See id.
60. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1295, 1400 (2000).
61. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2000).
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101 (broadly, the invention achieves a practical result) or of "novelty"
delineated in § 102 (broadly, the invention has not previously existed
within references considered and known as the "prior art").62
Additional key sections of the title include § 103, described as
"nonobviousness" (broadly, when comparing the prior art and the
claimed invention, the subject matter as a whole is not obvious to a
person with ordinary skill in the art pertaining to the subject matter of
the invention), and § 112, which includes the elements of enablement
and written description (broadly, requirements of how the claims must
be written, in order to enable their use and to establish, at the time the
application was filed, the inventor had possession of the claimed
subject matter).63
The Utility Examination Guidelines issued by the USPTO seek
to provide guidance regarding the patentability of human genetic
material, stating that DNA sequences are eligible for patent protection
when "isolated from their natural state and purified, and when the
application meets the requisite statutory criteria." 64 The Guidelines
further provide that a purified and isolated DNA molecule, which is
new and useful, is patentable; however the sequence information
describing the compound alone is non-statutory.65 Then Director of
the Biotechnology Examination Technology Center at the USPTO
(and now Deputy Commissioner), John Doll, wrote in May 1998 that
a patent application for a DNA sequence must be distinguished from
its nonpatentable naturally-occurring counterpart, in that the "patent
application must state that the invention has been purified or isolated
or is part of a recombinant molecule or is now part of a vector."
66
This argument, that the informational content of genetic material
that has been taken from its human source is somehow substantially
different from its configuration as it exists in nature, is at first glance
deceptively persuasive. The technological processes which allow for
the informational content of genetic materials in the human body to
be identified, i.e., "isolated" and "purified," are extremely complex.
They are significant achievements rendering these basic biological
materials useful. Nonetheless, a thorough examination of the types of
sequences that are actually being claimed and the manner in which
62. 35 U.S.C. § 102 (2000); see ROGER E. SCHECTER & JOHN R. THOMAS,
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: THE LAW OF COPYRIGHTS, PATENTS, AND TRADEMARKS 292, 315,
323 (2003).
63. See SCHECTER & THOMAS, supra note 62, at 369, 394, 398.
64. Utility Examination Guidelines, 66 Fed. Reg. 1092, 1093 (Jan. 5, 2001).
65. Id.
66. John J. Doll, The Patenting ofDNA, SCIENCE, Apr. 3, 1998, at 689.
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they are claimed fails to establish any meaningful distinctions under
the law. Instead, it reveals only an abstraction, a construct: "Thus
stripped of its identity as 'natural,' the unencumbered gene becomes
readily susceptible to the creation and layering upon it of a new legal
identity as 'man-made' through scientific interventions. 67
The informational content of "isolated and purified" human
DNA molecules, the actual basis of the claim, is indistinguishable
from the information as it exists in the natural environment. The
information reflects and represents the same inherent characteristics
and qualities of naturally-occurring human genes and DNA
sequences, and has the ability to dictate and perform the same
essential function of human genes found in nature-the capacity to
code for proteins. In fact, the processes defined as isolation and
purification used to extract the DNA from its natural source is only
done for the very purpose of obtaining the information necessary for
performing these exact and precise functions. Thus, in order to
determine whether the processes involved in the removal of this
information from the human body produces the required differentia to
render it statutory subject matter, it is necessary to examine the
composition of human genetic material and its functions, as well as
the precise claims of the subject matter of the potential patent. A
description of the science is important for an understanding of exactly
what comprises the sequences being claimed.68
"The entire collection of genetic material of a particular
organism is known as its 'genome.' Each cell of an organism contains
a copy of the same genome, in the form of a set of structures called
'chromosomes,' which are made up of DNA. 69  DNA
(deoxyribonucleic acid) is a long molecule found in each cell of every
living organism; it consists of two strands, each made from smaller
subunit molecules called nucleotides. These consist of a sugar
(deoxyribose, or D); a phosphate, and a base. There are four types of
bases: adenine (A), thymine (T), cystine (C), and guanine (G). In a
DNA molecule, each base has its unique complement: an A on one
strand is always paired with a T on the other, and a C is always paired
67. Jonathan Kahn, What's the Use? Law and Authority in Patenting Human Genetic
Material, 14 STAN. L. & POL'Y REv. 417, 426 (2003).
68. In discussing the nature of DNA as patentable subject manner, legal commentators
have delineated the basic science. See, e.g., Andrew Chin, Research in the Shadow of DNA
Patents, 87 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC'Y 846, 848-50 (2005); John M. Conley & Roberte
Makowski, Back to the Future: Rethinking the Product of Nature Doctrine as a Barrier to
Biotechnology Patents (Part 1), 85 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC'Y 301, 309-12 (2003).
69. Chin, supra note 68, at 848.
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with a G on the other.70 These complementary bases are joined by
weak hydrogen bonds, a process known as hybridization. 7' This
weakness allows strands of DNA to be separated and put back
together. Thus the DNA strands are flexible, similar to a rope ladder
or winding staircase visualized as the "double helix." 72
"The order of bases in one strand of a DNA molecule is referred
to as a molecule's 'structural formula,' 'nucleotide sequence,' or
'DNA sequence.' [DNA sequence] is also sometimes used to refer to
a DNA molecule itself."73 Thus,
The genome consists of the sequencing of the four bases-A, T,
C and G. The sequencing of the bases is the medium through
which DNA stores and ultimately transmits information. The
arrangement of these four bases... determines the nature,
functionality, and often the health of an organism. In this respect
the genome resembles a computer. Both can store enormous
amounts of information by the almost endless repetition of very
simple operations. In the case of the computer, the operation is
binary.... In the case of the [human] genome, it is a four-way
choice. .. repeated over and over, 3 billion times in the human74
genome.
However, some regions of the human genome have a specific
purpose, they are called genes, whose main function is to make
proteins, the process of which is known as gene expression.75 "DNA
provides the template and control mechanisms for making these
proteins."76
The making of proteins involves two steps known as
transcription and translation.77  Although DNA contains the
information required to build the protein, the copying and carrying of
70. Id. at 848-49
71. Conley & Makowski, supra note 68 at 310 (citing GEORGE B. JOHNSON, THE LIVING
WORLD 142 (1997)).
72. Id. (citing JOHNSON, supra note 71, at 141).
73. Chin, supra note 68, at 849 (citing Oak Ridge National Laboratory, Genome Glossary
http://www.ornl.gov/TechResources/HumanGenome/glossary (last visited June 17, 2002)
("[D]efining DNA sequence as 'The relative order of base pairs, whether in a DNA fragment,
gene, chromosome, or an entire genome."'); U.S. Patent No 5,935,837, claim 13 (filed July 28,
1997) (showing the usage of "the language '[a]n isolated and purified DNA sequence' to claim
an isolated and purified DNA molecule")).
74. Id. (citing Symposium on Bioinformatics and Intellectual Property Law, 8 B.U. J. SCi.
& TECH. 190, 196 (2002)).
75. Id. at 310-11 (citing HARVEY LODISH ET AL., MOLECULAR CELL BIOLOGY 114 (4th
ed. 2000)).
76. Id. at 311 (citing LODISH ET AL., supra note 75, at 111).
77. Id. (citing JOHNSON, supra note 71, at 143-46).
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that information to where it is needed is done by a related molecule,
RNA (ribonucleic acid), also made up of nucleotides; differing from
DNA, it has only one strand, is comprised of a different sugar, and
has a base U, uracil, instead of T, thymine.7 s During transcription, the
strands of DNA separate in the region containing the gene for that
protein. 79 Nucleotides of RNA match up with one strand of DNA,
their complementary strand, so "an RNA C binds to a G on the DNA
strand, an RNA G binds to a DNA C, and RNA U (the RNA version
of T) binds to a DNA A, and an RNA A to a DNA T."80 This creates a
strand of RNA called "messenger RNA" (mRNA), whose "code is the
complement of that on the template strand of DNA.'
Not all the DNA in a gene actually codes for proteins.82
"Introns" are the non-coding regions lying between the coding
regions, "exons." 83 As the primary mRNA strand (transcript) "is an
exact complement of the template DNA, it contains both the introns
and exons." 84 Introns are excised in a process called 'splicing,' which
produces mature mRNA, containing only the coding regions, which
then leaves the nucleus of the cell and enters the cytoplasm.85
Once in the cytoplasm, the second step of protein production
begins as:
The code transcribed on the mRNA is translated into a protein with
the help of another type of RNA, transfer RNA or tRNA. The
critical functional element in translation is the codon, a sequence
of three nucleotides on the mRNA that specifies, or codes for, a
particular amino acid.... Each unit of tRNA carries one of the
twenty amino acids that are the building blocks, as well as a three
nucleotide sequence (an anticodon) that is the complement of the
mRNA code for its amino acid.
86
Complexed with a ribosome, tRNA (with an anticodon),
binds to its complementary mRNA codon, thereby bringing the
specified amino acid into place. [As] this process continues....
[a]djacent amino acids are joined by chemical links called peptide
78. Id. (citing JOHNSON, supra note 71, at 143; LODISH ET AL., supra note 75, at 109).
79. Id. (citing LODISH ET AL., supra note 75, at 116)
80. Id. (citing JOHNSON, supra note 71, at 143).
81. Id. (citing JOHNSON, supra note 71, at 143).
82. Id. at 312.
83. Id. (citing LODISH ET AL., supra note 75, at 115).
84. Id. at 312.
85. Id. (citing LODISH ET AL., supra note 75, at 115-16).
86. Id. (citing JOHNSON, supra note 71, at 145-46) (citations omitted).
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bonds.... This chain of amino acids in a specific sequence forms a
protein, or polypeptide. 87
Thus, genes are now described as,
"the entire nucleic acid sequence that is necessary for the synthesis
of a functional polypeptide or RNA molecule." In addition to the
coding regions making up the sequence of amino acids to build a
protein, it also contains the regions that code for tRNA and rRNA
which make up the ribosome, the regions that control the
beginning of the transcription process, and the regions that regulate
the splicing of the primary mRNA transcripts.
88
The first case to deal with the generic subject of human genetic
material, Amgen, Inc. v. Chugai Pharmaceutical Co.,89 described the
process known as "isolation and purification" used by scientists to
identify any particular sequence or sequence fragment of human
DNA. The case described "cloning a gene" as obtaining or "isolating"
the portion of the double helix which contains the DNA sequence that
the cell uses to create a particular protein, and pulling it out,
extracting or "purifying" it."
90
Patent claims covering this "isolated and purified" human
genetic material can be a simple claim for the identified sequence.
The following example is one of numerous claims to the specific
genes involved in breast and ovarian cancer: "1. An isolated DNA
coding for a BRCA-1 polypeptide [protein], said polypeptide having
the amino acid sequence set forth in SEQ ID NO: 2."'9 1 According to
the definition provided in the patent, "isolated" is synonymous with
"substantially pure," denoting "a nucleic acid ... which is
substantially separated from other cellular components which
naturally accompany a native human sequence. 92  Thus, the
"separated" nucleic acid is clearly identical in all respects to the
naturally-occurring nucleic acid. Its informational content, the subject
of the claim, is also identical.
These isolation and purification techniques have rapidly
progressed, and continue to do so.93 Prior to 1983, what were known
87. Id. at 313 (citing NEIL A. CAMPBELL ET AL., BIOLOGY 184-85 (1994); JOHNSON,
supra note 71, at 145-46) (citations omitted).
88. Id. (citing LODISH ET AL., supra note 75, at 295) (citations omitted).
89. Amgen, Inc. v. Chugai Pharm. Co., 927 F.2d 1200 (Fed. Cir. 1991), cert. denied sub
nom. Genetic Inst., Inc. v. Amgen, Inc., 502 U.S. 856 (1991).
90. Id. at 1208.
91. U.S. Patent No. 5,747,282 col. 154 11. 56-58 (filed June 7, 1995).
92. Id. at col. 19 11. 8-12.
93. See supra notes 14-19 and accompanying text.
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as DNA libraries (dDNA), pools of a solution containing a set of all
of the DNA sequences comprising all the genes found in our body's
cells, were screened by biologists. 94 In addition, techniques were
developed to make "libraries" of complementary DNA (cDNA). A
cDNA molecule was simply a replication of the information
contained within a molecule of messenger mRNA, using an enzyme
in a test tube to reproduce the identical information.9 5 As described in
Amgen, short sequences of nucleotides called oligonucleotide probes
are used to screen the libraries and isolate the genes by a complex
series of steps.96 An example of a claim to a cDNA molecule is as
follows: "1. An isolated polypeptide comprising: ... (c) the amino
acid sequence of the polypeptide encoded by the full-length coding
sequence of the cDNA deposited under ATCC accession number
209957." 9' A DNA sequence, however, broadly describes not just the
informational content of the DNA, but of the mRNA as well, which in
turn can be used as a template for cDNA synthesis. The information
contained within the mRNA in its naturally-occurring state is, for
purposes of the patent, identical to the information contained within
this newly synthesized cDNA.
By 2000, scientists recognized the need to isolate DNA
sequences from its human source, such as blood or other tissue
samples, in a method that was computerized and affordable.
98
Described as "fully automatic high-throughput" instruments, the
initial prototype allowed for the "purification of human blood or
bacterial DNA in as little as 24 minutes." 99 A recent example of this
new type of claim covers "polynucleotides encoding a human G-
protein coupled receptor, HGPRBMY39."' 0 0 Claim 1 is for:
1. An isolated nucleic acid molecule consisting of a polynucleotide
sequence selected from the group consisting of:
(a) an isolated polynucleotide encoding a polypeptide consisting
of amino acids I to 370 of SEQ ID NO:2; and
94. Amgen, Inc. v. Chugai Pharm. Co., No. 87-2617-Y, 1989 WL 169006, at *7-8 (D.
Mass. Dec. 11, 1989).
95. Id. at *8.
96. See id. at *8-10 (describing the screening process).
97. U.S. Patent No. 7,294,690 col. 455 11. 20-31 (filed May 2, 2002).
98. Brian Bauman et al., Automated, Low Cost Isolation of Blood or Bacterial Genomic
DNA, RESEARCH ABSTRACTS FROM THE DOE HUMAN GENOME PROGRAM CONTRACTOR-
GRANTEE WORKSHOP VIII (2000),
http://www.oml.gov/sci/techresources/HumanGenome/publicat/OOsanta/42.html.
99. Id.
100. U.S. Patent No. 7,198,912 (filed Sept. 6, 2002).
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(b) an isolated polynucleotide encoding a polypeptide consisting
of amino acids 2 to 370 of SEQ ID NO:2. 01
Despite the advanced techniques utilized, it is still the sequence,
the informational content, that is the essence of what is being claimed,
and it is identical to that which existed in the human source.
The identification and isolation of the DNA sequence from its
human source is the starting point, the primary basis as a new
molecular diagnostic tool for infection, genetic diseases, inherited
traits, identity determination, and other research applications. Claims
are made on DNA sequences known as SNPs (single nucleotide
polymorphisms), DNA sequence variations that occur when a single
nucleotide (A, T, C, or G) in the genome is altered. For a variation to
be considered a SNP, it must occur in at least 1% of the population. In
a patent application for a susceptibility gene for obesity and Type II
diabetes, Claim 3 recites:
3. An isolated polynucleotide encoding a polypeptide having an
amino acid sequence of a 03-adrenergic receptor having a
substitution at amino acid residue 64 of arginine for trytophan and
wherein the substituted receptor is associated with having or at risk
of having an increased likelihood for developing Type II diabetes
mellitus and/or obesity.1
0 2
Thus, like other similar claims on naturally occurring DNA sequences
that have been isolated or removed from their natural environment,
the sequence of a SNP is identical to one occurring in an individuals'
DNA inside the body. If it varied in any way from its naturally
occurring form, it would not be useful as an identifier of a variation in
the general population.
Researchers involved in biotechnology do not simply claim only
the isolated DNA sequences or SNPs, but routinely, the isolated
sequence is the first claim in a series of claims for methods and
processes which correlate the existence of the sequence or SNP in an
individual's sample to the existence of a genetic susceptibility to a
particular disease. Examples include the claims to genes, such as
BRCA, relevant to breast and ovarian cancer. Claim 1 is: "1. An
isolated consensus DNA sequence of the BRCA1 coding sequence as
set forth in SEQ ID NO: 1 .,,103
Claim 2 is:
101. '912 Patent, at col. 297 II. 9-17.
102. U.S. Patent No. 5,766,851 col. 33 11. 22-27 (filed May 19, 2002).
103. U.S. Patent No. 5,654,155 col. 65 11. 44-45 (filed Feb. 12, 1996).
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2. A method of identifying individuals having a BRCA1 gene with
a BRCA1 coding sequence not associated with breast or ovarian
cancer comprising:
a) amplifying a DNA fragment of an individual's BRCA1
coding sequence using an oligonucleotide primer which
specifically hybridizes to sequences within the gene;
b) sequencing said amplified fragment by dideoxy sequencing;
c) repeating steps (a) and (b) until said individual's BRCA1
coding sequence is completely sequenced;
d) comparing the sequence of said amplified DNA to the
sequence of SEQ ID NO. 1;
e) determining the presence or absence of each of the following
polymorphic variations in said individual's BRCA1 coding
sequence... ;
f) determining any sequence differences between said
individual's BRCA1 coding sequences and SEQ. ID. NO: I
wherein the presence of any of the said polymorphic variations and
the absence of a polymorphism outside of positions 2201, 2430,
2731, 3232, 3667, 4427, and 4956, is correlated with an absence of
increased genetic susceptibility to breast or ovarian cancer
resulting from a BRCA1 mutation in the BRCA1 coding
104
sequence.
In the preceding series of claims, Claim 1 is simply directed to
the identified and isolated sequence that represents or refers to the
mutation within the specific gene. In such a state, the sequential
information is fundamentally identical to what exists in nature; it
exhibits no substantial sequence differences and its function in the
body, to code for a protein, is identical to the uses for which the
information is being patented.
Claim 2 covers the amplification of DNA fragments that
collectively constitute a particular individual's BRCA1 gene and the
subsequent sequencing of these DNA fragments. This is essentially
the identification of an individuals' naturally-occurring BRCA1 gene
sequence. The informational content of the sequences representing the
arrangement or ordering of chemical bases is necessarily identical
whether inside the individual's body or isolated in a test tube.
Similarly, the function of this information is identical. The presence
or absence of specific polymorphic variations correlates to
susceptibility to breast or ovarian cancers. Therefore, if these isolated
104. Id. at col. 65 1. 46-col. 66 1. 54.
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sequences of extricated information were not identical, they would be
useless and perhaps dangerous, rendering them diagnostically
imprecise.
Thus, considering the basic scientific knowledge regarding the
structure of DNA and DNA sequences, as well as the precise nature
of what is actually being claimed, a consistent principle emerges
when assessing the statutory nature of human genetic sequences.
Claims cover the information, the inherent knowledge revealed in the
identified genetic sequence, and although the various processes that
facilitate this identification might themselves be suitable subject
matter, the revealed, identified, isolated, purified and/or replicated
information is identical to that contained within its human source and
is outside the scope of suitable subject matter for the grant of a patent.
II: LAWS OF NATURE AND HUMAN DNA SEQUENCES.
The Court has recognized limits to patentable subject matter
under § 101. As stated in the 1981 Supreme Court case Diamond v.
Diehr, 0 5 "every discovery is not embraced within the statutory terms.
Excluded from such patent protection are laws of nature, natural
phenomenon and abstract ideas. '0 6 The Court has given examples of
such exclusions, including Newton's law of Gravitation describing
the gravitational force between two objects as a function of their
distance and mass,10 7 Einstein's law for the inter-conversion of energy
and mass,108 the formula for determining the circumference of a
circle, 10 9 the Arrhenius equation,11 0 and the multiplication tables. 1 '
According to the Court, these laws reveal "a relationship that has
always existed."
' 12
Scientific principles, including their mathematical expressions,
are synonymous with the excluded category.1" 3 Ideas and abstract
concepts, which are the necessary basis for scientific and
technological work, are similarly non-patentable.1 14 The Court
recognizes that these eternal laws of nature, even if recently
105. Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175 (1981).
106. Id. at 185.
107. Parkerv. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 593 n.15 (1978).
108. Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U. S. 303, 309 (1980).
109. Flook, 437 U.S. at 595.
110. Diehr, 450 U.S. at 188.
111. Flook, 437 U.S. at 598 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
112. Flook, 437 U.S. at 593 n.15.
113. See Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67 (1972).
114. Id. at67.
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discovered, should be universally accessible rather than exclusively
possessed, and ruled that Congress should not privatize these natural
laws; rather they should remain in the public domain." 
5
A well known case exemplifies the laws of nature doctrine. In
the 1853 case O'Reilly v. Morse," 6 in considering the patenting of the
invented telegraph, the Court questioned whether the underlying
principle of electro-magnetism became similarly patentable when
contained within a patentable process involving the new and useful
application of the principle." 7 Claim eight of the patent stated that
Morse was not claiming the specific machinery, but rather "the
motive power of the electric or galvanic current."" 8 The Court found
this claim an unpatentable scientific principle, electromagnetism
itself, as opposed to its creation by a process or machinery.' 1
9
The Court reiterated the concepts underlying the doctrine that
laws of nature are not suitable subject matter for the grant of a patent.
Describing the claim as too broad, it would give Morse exclusive
rights to every such use of electromagnetism, including those to
subsequent inventions that he himself did not create. It would deter
innovation and deprive the public of the benefits of those possible
new inventions.120
The genetic code is similarly illustrative of a fixed relationship
which is universal and timeless: the translation of the DNA sequence
to produce proteins. Accordingly, the genetic code is a law of nature.
Just as the grant of a patent in Morse for all uses of the principle of
electromagnetism would have given exclusive rights to all uses of the
principle, the grant of a patent to the information in a specific DNA
sequence restricts public access to the genetic code itself, a law of
nature, when the instructions contained within that DNA for
assembling amino acids into a specific protein are excluded from use.
Thus, patents on the information contained within DNA sequences,
whether existing in their natural environment or having been isolated,
purified, or replicated, are not statutory subject matter.
Similarly, the innate, pre-existing information of isolated human
DNA is also a scientific principle, as opposed to any process or
115. In re Meyer, 688 F.2d 789, 795 (C.C.P.A. 1982) (citing Le Roy v. Tatham, 55 U.S.
(14 How.) 156, at 175 (1852)); Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127, 130
(1948); Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1,6 (1965).
116. O'Reilly v. Morse, 56 U.S. (15 How.) 62 (1853).
117. Id.
118. Id. at 112.
119. Id. at 120.
120. Seeid. atll3.
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machine for identifying or replicating a segment of human DNA.
They are expressions of the same basic scientific principles and
truths, the scientific information existing in DNA and DNA sequences
within the human body. Although the information of human genetic
material is either intangible information contained within a molecule
or can be considered information materialized or embodied in a
molecule, it is the intangible information for which the patent is being
sought, whether existing in its natural environment or having been
identified, isolated, purified, or replicated. Without the inclusion of
the innate information, the molecule is irrelevant for a patent claim.
Alternatively, it is arguable that the claimed molecule is actually the
embodied information itself; it is the precise arrangement of chemical
base pairs being sought. One cannot patent the physical entity without
claiming the scientific relationship the genetic material represents or
deciphers in its natural state.'
2
'
This genetic information is a basic tool of scientific and
technological work, and exclusive rights to its use should not be
granted. Doing so removes this age old knowledge from the public
domain. Just as Morse's claim to all uses of electromagnetism was
denied patent protection for these justifications, the potential to deter
innovation and deprive the public the benefits of possible inventions,
patents on the informational content of DNA sequences should not be
granted.
Thus, various claims to human DNA sequences, whether or not
they have been identified, isolated, purified, or replicated is a
manifestation of a law of nature. As information, it is an expression of
an idea, a pre-existing scientific truth or principle and ultimately a
research tool, and represents an express limitation on statutory subject
matter.
A. Representations of Base Pairs as Reading on the
Information Itself
A recent Federal Circuit decision, In re Nuijten,' 22 questioned
whether a patent claim for intangible information falls into any of the
enumerated categories of statutory subject matter. 2 3 The court
121. See GLOBAL GENOME, supra note 6, at 20 ("However, the key to understanding the
complexities of genetics and biotechnology is in the realization of a paradox at the core of the
concept of biological exchange: that biology is information, and, crucially, that information is
both material and immaterial.").
122. In re Nuijten, 500 F.3d 1346, 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
123. Id.
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considered whether "transitory electrical and electromagnetic signals
propagating through some medium, such as wires, air, or a
vacuum,"' 124 were encompassed by the enumerated categories of 35
U.S.C. § 101: "process, machine, manufacture, or composition of
matter."1 25 The claimed invention was directed to a technique for
improved "watermarking," a technology whereby an original signal
(such as a digital audio file) is embedded or encoded with additional
data. The claimed technique improved the technology by further
modifying the watermarked signal, compensating for the distortion
caused by the watermark.
2 6
The court noted that the process claims of the invention were
proper subject matter for a grant of a patent, as were "any apparatus
for generating, receiving, processing or storing the signals," but the
claims on appeal sought to cover only the resulting encoded
signals. 27 Claim 14 reads: "A signal with embedded supplemental
data, the signal being encoded in accordance with a given encoding
process and selected samples of the signal representing the
supplemental data, and at least one of the samples preceding the
selected samples is different from the sample corresponding to the
given encoding process."' 28 The Board affirmed rejections of Claim
14: they reasoned that the claim was an unpatentable abstract idea as
the signal had no physical attributes, and the claimed signal was not
within any of the four categories of statutory subject matter. 29
The court first examined the issue of how the claim was
constructed, recognizing that statutory subject matter is an issue of
both claim and statutory construction. 30 The determination would be
based upon whether the claims were limited to covering only
"physical" instances of the signals, or if they also covered the
disembodied, numerical information of the signal itself.'3' While
agreeing with Nuijten's argument that the signal must be in some
physical form in order to be perceived, the court stated that as long as
a recipient could understand the message of a signal, the form or type
of the signal's physical carrier was irrelevant to the disputed
124. id. at 1352.
125. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2000).
126. In reNuijten, 500 F.3d at 1348-49.
127. Id. at 1351.
128. Id. (emphasis omitted).
129. Id. at 1351-52.
130. Id. at 1352 (citing State St. Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Fin. Group, Inc., 149 F.3d
1368, 1370 (Fed. Cir. 1998)).
131. Id. at 1353.
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claims.132 Even though the claims required physical substance, the
specific nature of the carrier was not delineated. Thus, the court
reiterated that Claim 14 was simply for the signal's informational
content, and was therefore non-statutory subject matter. 33
Specific patent claims to DNA sequences illustrate that, like
Nuijten's signal, the only limitations in these claims address the
informational content of the DNA being claimed. DNA is a nucleic
acid containing four bases, A, C, G, and T, "appear[ing] in a linear
array along the DNA molecule."' 134 A DNA sequence is a unique
arrangement of those bases, like a correctly spelled word using the
right arrangement of letters. 135 However, the nature of DNA is not just
one of a static chemical compound, but also functions as a dynamic
template, with the embodied information specifying instructions for
synthesizing a specific protein. 136 Described by geneticist Dr. Max
Perutz:
The structure of DNA gave to the concept of the gene a physical
and chemical meaning by which all its properties can be
interpreted. Most important, DNA-right there in the physical
facts of its structure-is both autocatalytic and heterocatalytic.
That is, genes have the dual function, to dictate the construction of
more DNA, identical to themselves, and to dictate the construction
of proteins very different from themselves. 
137
This basic nature and function of DNA is exemplified in the
previously examined BRCA patents, all of which claim a simple
coding sequence. Like the signal in Nuijten, they are simply being
claimed for the facts of their structure. Although this recitation of an
order of chemical base pairs is embodied, it is nonetheless being
claimed for the ability to instruct the building of identical DNA or
proteins, its use as the disembodied arrangement of the chemical
bases. These claims thus read on the sequences which have been
identified as the genes associated with breast cancer. It is patented
information, the unauthorized use of which is an act of infringement.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Eileen M. Kane, Splitting the Gene: DNA Patents and the Genetic Code, 71 TENN. L.
REV. 707,708 (2004).
135. See id. 708, 709 n.4 (quoting Dr. Marshall Nirenberg, The Genetic Code, Nobel
Lecture (Dec. 12, 1968), in NOBEL LECTURES IN PHYSIOLOGY OR MEDICINE: 1963-1970, AT
372, 390 (1972)).
136. Id. at 712.
137. Id. at 710 n.1 I (quoting Dr. Max Perutz in HORACE FREELAND JUDSON, THE EIGHTH
DAY OF CREATION: MAKERS OF THE REVOLUTION IN BIOLOGY 7 (expanded ed. 1996)).
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A described claim, although once embodied as a molecular structure,
is also information representative of that structure; a formula
describing what a particular DNA sequence codes. It is a set of
instructions for how the protein is synthesized when the DNA
template is decoded into RNA by enzymes in the cell, and the
subsequent decoding of the RNA into protein.
Similarly, on a patent claim for the SNP suggesting susceptibility
to obesity and type I diabetes mellitus, the essence of the claim seeks
to patent the pure information revealed in the claimed sequence. The
only limitation of this claim, like the signal in Nuijten, reads on its
informational content: in essence, the pure information itself is the
actual basis for the claim. A proper construction of the claim asks
whether, like the signal, the isolated sequence encoding for a protein
with certain substitutions, these substitutions representing a variation
within the information of the sequence associated with Type II
diabetes or obesity, is limited to the tangible material of the isolated
polynucleotide. Or, if the claims also cover the intangible ordering of
abstract numbers, merely unencumbered numerical information.
Analogous to the signal at issue in Nuijten, the isolated
polynucleotide encoding for the protein has physical substance, but
like the claim for the signal, the claim for the isolated polynucleotide
does not specifically reference its "carrier element." Rather it is the
sequence itself, the "merely numerical information" representing the
order of the chemical bases which is the essence of the claim. In fact,
the use of the term "isolated" can also suggest that its "carrier
element" is of no import in the construction of the claim; the
information having been identified and "extricated" from the carrier
molecule. The important element, like the signal, is the fact that "a
recipient can understand the message." The specific type or form of
its physical carrier, i.e., the molecule, is totally irrelevant to the
claim. 13
As with the signal, the only meaningful consideration is the
recipient's ability to comprehend the message contained within the
information, the representation of an arrangement of base pairs.
Patent claims on these sequences "read on the information" itself.
Like similar expressions of mathematical formulas, algorithms,
scientific principles and laws of nature, this informational content
does not constitute statutory subject matter.
138. See In re Nuijten, 500 F.3d 1346, 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
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B. Patents that Preempt Preexisting Scientific Principles
The metaphoric relationship between computer and information
technologies and human genetics has been examined by scientists,
social scientists, and philosophers of science. 139 Comparing the
expression of a gene to a mathematical algorithm such as those
involved in the writing of computer software programs suggests that
the purely informative nature of genetic sequences are synonymous to
the codes of computer software. The cellular machinery is the
hardware executing either naturally occurring or technologically
produced software, the genetic code encrypted in the DNA. 1
40
Similarly, the "information processing" system implemented by
the workings of genetic sequences is analogous to the workings
involved in computer technology systems. 14 Both systems encode
information used in controlling and directing either the biological
processes, the workings of a cell, or of a computer system. 42 The
instructions and data of nucleotide sequences are encoded and stored
in biological containers. 143 Specific binary encoded sequences of
electrical, magnetic, or optical data are stored in a computer
system. 144 Both produce informational outputs when the instructions
have been executed or when data is accessed: messenger RNA in the
case of human genetic material and, e.g., communication signals in
computer technology.1
45
The Report discussed above acknowledges DNA sequences as
patented for their informational content and asserts that the analogous
nature of human genetics and computer technologies might provide
guidance in a challenge to the validity of patents issued to human
genes. 146 The Report noted that:
Older cases have excluded from patent protection "scientific
truths" and "abstract ideas." The sequence of genomes, the
identification of polymorphisms and haplotypes, the development
139. See supra notes 1-10 and accompanying text.
140. See, e.g., Mark Christopher Farrell, Designer DNA for Humans: Biotech Patent Law
Made Interesting for the Average Lawyer, 35 GONZ. L. REV. 515, 532 (1999-2000) (citing
Milagros del Corral, Legal Aspects of Genome Protection, in 2 THE HUMAN GENOME PROJECT:
LEGAL ASPECTS 227, 230 (Fundaci6n BBV ed., Larry Lilue trans., 1994)).
141. See Brief for Houston Intellectual Prop. Law Ass'n as Amici Curiae Urging Reversal,
In re Beauregard, 53 F.3d 1583 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (No. 95-1054).
142. Id. at 3.
143. See id.
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. See Report, supra note 9, at 76-77.
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of gene expression profiles, and the determination of protein
structures all provide valuable scientific information that arguably
falls within these exclusions ... if the patent claims read beyond
the materials themselves and attempt to define the invention in
such a way that the use of information would be an act of patent
infringement. Recent decisions concerning the patentability of
computer-implemented inventions may provide more guidance
than prior decisions about the patentability of discoveries in the life
sciences and in predicting the patentability of informational
inventions in genomics and proteomics.
147
Claims to previously described types of isolated and purified
DNA and DNA sequences are claims to information independent of
its physical source which, when used by others than the patent-
holders, are infringed. Contemporary cases dealing with algorithms in
computer technology have further delineated the laws of nature
doctrine. They are analogous and will have precedential value if
patents granted to the informational content of human genetic
material are challenged.
In the 1972 case, Gottschalk v. Benson,148 the Court questioned
whether a method for converting numerical information from binary-
coded decimal numbers into pure binary numbers for programming
conventional, general purpose digital computers was a statutory
process. 149 The Court noted that the claims were not for a specific
device or machine or any resulting use. Rather, they claimed any use
of the method in any computer or any type of general-purpose digital
computer. 50 The Court described the claim as an algorithm, defined
as "[a] procedure for solving a given mathematical problem" or "a
generalized formulation for programs to solve mathematical
problems."' 5 1 The claims were merely variations on the ordinary
arithmetic that could be performed by existing computers, as well as
by a human without the aid of a computer. 52
The Court recognized that "[a] principle, in the abstract, is a
fundamental truth; an original cause; a motive; these cannot be
patented, as no one can claim in either of them an exclusive right."'
53
The Court held that the claimed invention was non-statutory subject
147. Id. at 76-77 (citations omitted).
148. Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63 (1972).
149. Id. at 64.
150. Id.
151. Id. at 65.
152. See id. at 67.
153. Id. (citing Le Roy v. Tatham, 55 U.S. (14 How.) 156, 175 (1852)).
2009]
494 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. [Vol. 25
matter and that granting a patent on a formula for converting the
numbers would be a patent granted to the algorithm itself, the effect
of which would totally preempt its use in any other application.1
54
In 1978, the Court in Parker v. Flook5 5 considered whether a
method for updating alarm limits during the process of catalytic
conversion was suitable subject matter for the grant of a patent. 56 The
method consisted of three steps: one which initially measured the
temperature; a second which used an algorithm defined as "a
procedure for solving a given type of mathematical program" to
calculate a new value for an alarm limit, and a final "post solution"
step that adjusts the alarm limit to the updated value. 157 The claims
did not cover every possible application of the formula and the
formula could be used outside the industry for which it was being
applied.
58
The Court relied upon Benson to determine whether the claimed
process was within the scope of statutory subject matter.159
Considering an algorithm a mathematical formula, an unpatentable
law of nature, the Court ruled the process to be non-statutory. 60
Parker did not find that the lack of a total pre-emption of the formula
or the "post-solution activity" of adjusting the alarm limit to the
newly computed limit distinguished the case from Benson.16' Rather,
in determining whether the claimed process was within the scope of
patentable subject matter, the Court stressed that the process itself
must be new and useful. 162 An algorithm, as a basic scientific or
technological tool, whether it was known or unknown at the time of
the claimed invention, is treated as being within the prior art.' 63 In
Parker, the scientific principle was well known and not entitled to a
patent. 1
64
The Court stated that one could not simply add the description of
a practical application of an abstract idea to make it patentable. If this
were the case, the determination of statutory subject matter would
154. Id. at 72.
155. Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584 (1978).
156. Id. at585.
157. Id. at 586 & n.1 (quoting Gottschalk, 409 U.S. at 65).
158. Parker, 437 U.S. at 589-90.
159. Id.
160. id. at 594.
161. Id. at590.
162. Id. at 591.
163. Id. at 592.
164. Id. at 594.
NON-STATUTORY NATURE OF DNA
rely on how the claim was drafted, contrary to the principles
regarding the inability to patent ideas or laws of nature. 165 Since all
other features of the invention were not new, including the use of
computers for "automatic monitoring-alarming," the Court described
the claim as simply a new and, perhaps, improved method for
calculating the values.' 66 Thus, Parker held that "if a claim is directed
essentially to a method of calculating, using a mathematical formula,
even if the solution is for a specific purpose, the claimed method is
nonstatutory."'
' 67
The Court noted that a law of nature was not the type of
invention for which the statute was enacted. 68 A footnote in the case
expounds upon the rationale: scientific principles such as the
respondent's algorithm reveal permanent preexisting relationships and
their mere recognition should not be given exclusionary rights.
169
Patentable subject matter must be new or novel, not simply newly
discovered. In granting patents, the public should not be denied rights
it freely enjoyed in the past. 70
The Court also noted that the patent claim must be considered in
its entirety. The process is unpatentable subject matter not because it
contains a mathematical algorithm, but because once the algorithm is
designated as within the prior art, the entire claim is not an invention
suitable for patenting. An inventive application of a well-known
phenomenon of nature or mathematical formula may be patented; a
patent, however, cannot be granted on its discovery unless the claim
also contains another inventive concept.' 71 Thus, because the
algorithm, the law of nature, pre-existed the claimed invention, and
because there were no other inventive concepts in its application, the
process was considered non statutory. 1
72
A case from the Federal Circuit, In re Warmerdam,'73 examined
whether mathematical calculations performed with mathematical
algorithms to generate a data structure was statutory subject matter. 174
The claimed invention was based upon technology called "bubble
165. Id. at 593.
166. Id. at 594-95.
167. Id. at 595 (quoting In re Richmond, 563 F.2d 1026, 1030 (C.C.P.A. 1977)).
168. Id. at 589.
169. Id. at 593 n.15.
170. Id.
171. Id. at 594.
172. Id.
173. In re Warmerdam, 33 F.3d 1354 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
174. Id. at 1355.
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systems" used to avoid collisions between moving objects.' 75 Objects
to be avoided were treated as if they were circles or spheres large
enough to be enclosed, assuming that any motion impinging on the
circle would cause the collision.' 76 The claim was merely directed to a
refined technique called "bubble bursting," where the spherical
bubble zone was replaced with a set of smaller zones if a collision
were detected. 177 The claimed invention involved methods for
generating a "data structure," which itself was not described, but
which included the measured "dimensions and coordinates of the
bubble hierarchy," and a machine which had a memory containing
data that represented the bubble hierarchy.1
78
The claimed collision-avoidance technique involved an arranged
hierarchy of bubbles along an object's medial axis, resulting in
computational efficiency. 179 Claim 1 referred to a method for locating
the medial axis of a shape and then creating the bubble hierarchy on
the axis. 180 Claims 2-4 were for "top-down" and "bottom-up"
procedures, including the use of mathematical algorithms, to create
the hierarchies. 181 Claim 5 was for the machine, i.e., the computer
with memory containing the data representing the hierarchy, and
Claim 6 was for the data structure generated by the methods of claims
1-4.182 The Board sustained the examiner's rejections of claims 1-6,
noting that claims 1-4 and 6 were rejected as lacking statutory subject
matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101.183
The Federal Circuit examined the function of the process and
whether the process itself constitutes an abstract idea, natural
phenomenon, or law of nature. 184 The two steps of Claim 1 involved
solving a mathematical algorithm using a Hilditch Skeletization
method. 185 Claims 2-4 were also mathematical in nature. 186 The court
cited cases where process steps similar to the claims in 1-4, described
as "computing," "determining," "cross-correlating," "comparing,"
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. Id. at 1356.
178. Id. at 1355.
179. Id. at 1356-57.
180. Id. at 1357.
181. See id. at 1357-58.
182. Id. at 1358.
183. Id. (noting that Claim 6 was specifically rejected "on the ground[s] that a 'data
structure' is not within one of the categories of patentable subject matter listed in § 101.")
184. Id. at 1359-60.
185. Id.
186. Id.
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"selecting," "initializing," "testing," "modifying," and "identifying"
were found to implicitly recite the implementation of a mathematical
algorithm. 187 Although recognizing that the method could be used
without the algorithm, the issue was whether the claimed process
went beyond manipulating abstract ideas or natural phenomenon.
1 88
The court asserted that the claims of locating the axis and
creating the hierarchy only described this basic manipulation, the
paradigm of an abstract idea.1 89 Rejecting the argument that the claim
might also contain a physical measuring step, the court found this
"indistinguishable from [a] data gathering step which ... [is]
insufficient, standing alone, to impart patentability" to claims 1-4.190
The data structure of Claim 6 was considered to be "physical or
logical relationships among data elements, designed to support
specific manipulation functions."' 9' The claim was found to be
"another way of describing the manipulation of the ideas contained
[in the claimed process]" rather than a physical structure which
arranged the contents of a memory, and was rejected by the court for
lack of statutory subject matter.1 92
Like the claimed algorithms underlying the processes of Benson,
human genetic sequences are similarly pre-existent scientific
principles and laws of nature and thus non-statutory subject matter.
Like the mathematical formula which converted numerical
information, a DNA sequence is, in essence, an algorithm for the
production of proteins. Where the algorithm in Benson "convert[ed]
one form of numerical representation to another,"'9 3 the process of
identifying, isolating, purifying, and replicating the information
contained within DNA existing in its natural state into its identified
state, similarly converts one form of numerical representation into
another. The content of the information does not differ as a result of
the conversion. Although newly identified or isolated, claimed genetic
sequences represent relationships that are pre-existing scientific
principles.
Like the non-statutory algorithm in Benson, there is nothing
"new" in the intangible or embodied information of isolated DNA.
187. Id. at 1359 (citing In re Grams, 888 F.2d 835 (Fed. Cir. 1989); In re Meyer, 688 F.2d
789 (C.C.P.A. 1982); and In re Johnson, 589 F.2d 1070 (C.C.P.A. 1978)).
188. Id. at 1359.
189. Id.
190. Id. at 1360 (citing Grams, 888 F.2d at 840).
191. See id. at 1362 (quoting IEEE, IEEE STANDARD COMPUTER DICTIONARY (1991)).
192. Id. at 1362.
193. Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 65 (1972).
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Nor is there any claimed machine or apparatus implementing the
information, it stands alone. As in Benson, where the claimed patent
would wholly pre-empt the algorithm, patent rights to the use of this
information wholly pre-empt its use. This occurs when the patent-
holder of DNA or a DNA sequence excludes others from utilizing that
particular sequence as a template to the information contained in the
genetic code.
The algorithm in Flook was described solely as a process for
solving a mathematical problem. 194 Similarly, claims to identified,
isolated, purified DNA sequences do not contain "other inventive
concepts." 195 Although it is arguable that these newly identified
sequences are representative of a practical application of the
information contained within human genetic material, they are
nevertheless identical to those found in nature.
The addition of the description "isolated and purified" can be
similarly seen as the work of a "competent draftsman... attach[ing]
some form of post-solution activity" to the algorithm represented by
the instructions contained within the genetic sequence information.'
96
Like the practical application of updating alarm limits in Flook, a
gene in an isolated and purified form simply provides a new and
better method for the identical calculations involved in the workings
of genetic information. The practical application of the genetic
information as a whole is directed to the use of a formula, the
instructions for the synthesis of proteins through gene expression.
Although the process by which the information has been
identified and isolated might be new, the information of a genetic
sequence obtained by these processes is not new, but has pre-existed
in the natural environment. The sequence, like the algorithm, existed
before the invention was claimed. 197 Similar to the algorithm in Flook,
the information is "within the prior art.'' 198 There are no other
"inventive concepts" being claimed.
In Warmerdam, claims involving equations for solving the
problems regarding the collision of objects were non-statutory. The
step of physically measuring an object's contours was seen as a data
gathering step insufficient to impart patentability when standing
194. See Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 585 (1978).
195. ld at 594.
196. Id. at 590.
197. See id. at 594.
198. Id
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alone. 199 Similarly the process of identifying, isolating, purifying,
and/or replicating the information of a DNA sequence, SNP, or cDNA
results in a claim for the same information, what the court found
objectionable as merely "a manipulatfion] of 'abstract ideas' [and]
'natural phenomenon."' 2 00
Precision regarding the terminology was not required in
examining whether the claims in Warmerdam implicitly recited the
solving of a mathematical algorithm. Many terms were cited as
representative of the basic underlying concept, including
"identifying. '20 The terminology, "isolated and purified" represents
nothing more than a manipulation of abstract, numerical information,
which, in essence, is simply identifying and retrieving the natural
phenomenon of the information in a DNA sequence. A physical
measurement, or gathering of data, standing alone, was insufficient to
have made the claims statutory in Warmerdam.20 2 The isolation and
purification process is nothing more than a similar data gathering
technique and does not impart patentability for claims to the innate
information being claimed. Claims for the information of DNA
sequences, like the claims in Benson, Flook, and Warmerdam, are
similarly directed to non-statutory laws of nature.
C. The Transformative Nature of Process Claims
Subsequent decisions of the Court and lower courts regarding
computer-related technologies have similar precedential value when
considering patents on the informational content of human genetic
material and whether they should be considered to claim non-
statutory laws of nature.
20 3
In Diamond v. Diehr,2 °4 the Court distinguished Benson and
Flook while considering whether a process using a mathematical
algorithm and a programmed digital computer in order to cure
synthetic rubber was patentable subject matter.20 5 The claimed
invention improved upon the process of curing rubber by constantly
measuring the temperature inside the mold and feeding those
199. In re Warmerdam, 33 F.3d 1354, 1360 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
200. Id.
201. Id. at 1359.
202. Id. at 1360.
203. See, e.g., Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175 (1981); Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63
(1972); Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584 (1978).
204. Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175 (1981).
205. Diehr, 450 U.S, at 177.
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temperature measurements into a computer.20 6 Using a mathematical
formula, the Arrhenius equation, the computer would periodically
recalculate the cure time. 20 7 When the recalculated time equaled the
time when the press was closed, the computer sent a signal for the
press to be opened.2 °8
Unlike the claim in Benson, where the algorithm was used to
convert numbers, or the claimed formula for computing an updated
alarm limit in Flook, the Court found the respondents did not seek a
patent on a mathematical formula. 20 9 "Instead they [sought] patent
protection for a process of curing synthetic rubber. Their process
admittedly employ[ed] a well-known mathematical equation, but they
[did] not seek to pre-empt the use of that equation."2 10 The
respondents only claimed the use of that equation in conjunction with
the other enumerated steps in their claimed process. 2 1 The Court
maintained that,
when a claim containing a mathematical formula implements or
applies that formula in a structure or process which, when
considered as a whole, is performing a function which the patent
laws were designed to protect (e.g., transforming or reducing an
article to a different state or thing), then the claim satisfies the
requirements of § 101.
212
Viewing the claim as drawn to a transformative industrial process for
molding rubber, rather than an attempt to patent the underlying
mathematical formula, the Court held that the process was statutory
subject matter.2t 3
The processes of identification, isolation, purification, and
replication of naturally-occurring DNA sequences do not transform
the retrieved information into something other than the information
originally existing in its natural environment. A transformative step is
required for patentability as illustrated by cases dealing with
algorithms and computer technology. Where the Arrhenius equation
in Diehr was implemented to produce cured rubber, the equation or
principle involved in the recitation or replication of a DNA sequence,
i.e., the formula, the abstract idea of the information contained within
206. Id. at 178-79.
207. Id.
208. Id.
209. Id. at 186-87.
210. Id. at 187.
211. Id.
212. Id. at 192.
213. Id. at 192-93.
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a gene, remains identical to the original equation or principle found in
nature despite the techniques involved in the process of "isolation and
purification." Thus, patent claims to this sequential information,
unlike the process involved in Diehr, are not in any way
transformative.
Claims were upheld following Diehr where transformations
occurred.214 In In re Alappat, the invention was for "a means for
creating a smooth waveform display in a digital oscilloscope. 21 5
Claim 15 covered "[a] rasterizer for converting vector list data
representing sample magnitudes of an input waveform into anti-
aliased pixel illumination intensity data to be displayed on a display
means" and was comprised of four steps.
216
The court described the rasterizer of Claim 15 as a machine.21 7
The court discussed cases such as Flook, noting that a process which
employed a law of nature would be patentable even though such law
of nature would not.21 8 A claim containing an algorithm within a
process which transforms an article is statutory. 219 The means of
Claim 15 represented circuitry elements that performed mathematical
calculations, and the algorithms combined with these circuitry
elements formed a machine which transformed the data samples into
displayable intensity data.220 This process was not an abstract idea,
but a specific machine which produced a useful, concrete, and
tangible result.2
The expansion of the scope of patentable subject matter was
exemplified by the seminal 1998 Federal Circuit case State Street
Bank & Trust v. Signature Financial Group.222 The case examined
whether a data processing system for implementing an investment
214. See, e.g., In re Alappat, 33 F.3d 1526, 1544 (Fed. Cir. 1994); State St. Bank & Trust
v. Signature Fin. Group, 149 F.3d 1368, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 1998); AT&T Corp. v. Excel
Commc'ns, Inc., 172 F.3d 1352, 1359-60 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
215. Alappat, 33 F.3d at 1537.
216. Id. at 1538-39.
217. Id. at 1541
218. See, e.g., id. at 1542 n.18.
219. Id. at 1543 (citing Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 192 (1981); In re Iwahashi, 888
F.2d 1370, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 1989); In re Taner, 681 F.2d 787, 789 (C.C.P.A. 1982)).
220. Id. at 1544.
221. Id. A recent decision from the Federal Circuit, In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943 (Fed. Cir.
2008), discussed infra at notes 254-277 and accompanying text, affirms the holding that the
definitive test for patentability relies on the transformative nature of the claimed process, and
that the "useful, concrete and tangible result" test, first "set forth in Alappat," is not the
"appropriate inquiry." See In re Bilski, 545 F.3d at 959-60 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
222. State St. Bank & Trust v. Signature Fin. Group, 149 F.3d 1368, 1373 (Fed. Cir.
1998).
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structure for the administration and accounting of mutual funds was
suitable subject matter for the grant of a patent.2 23
The system, known as "Hub and Spoke," implements a
"structure whereby mutual funds (the Spokes) pool their assets in an
investment portfolio (Hub) organized as a partnership., 224 The system
"allows an administrator to monitor and record financial information
flow and make all calculations necessary for maintaining a...
financial services fund" for the members involved in the
partnership. 5 Claim 1, covering the data processing system, was
comprised of "means" including a computer processor, a data disk as
the storage means and arithmetic logic circuits for storing and
processing the data.226 The court found that Claim 1 was for a
machine which processed data for managing financial services. 227
The court, relying on Diehr, found this machine patentable
subject matter.228 Abstract ideas became patentable when they were
reduced to some type of practical application, i.e., "a useful, concrete
and tangible result. '229 The court relied on Alappat for the proposition
that the transformation of the wavelength data constituted an example
of an abstract idea, like a mathematical algorithm, which had been
practically applied.230 Thus, the court held that this machine allowed
for the transformation of data using a series of mathematical
calculations to determine a final share price. 231 This constituted a
practical application of the underlying mathematical principle (i.e.,
algorithm, formula, or calculation) and produced a result which was
223. Id. at 1370.
224. Id.
225. Id. at 1371.
226. Id. at 1371-72.
227. Id. at 1372.
228. Id. at 1373.
229. Id. (citing In re Alappat, 33 F.3d 1526, 1544 (Fed. Cir. 1994)). Cf In re Bilski, 545
F.3d 943, 960 n.19 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (reaffirming the "machine or transformation test" and in a
footnote stating: "As a result, those portions of our opinions in State Street and AT&T relying
solely on a 'useful, concrete and tangible result' should no longer be relied upon.").
230. State St., 149 F.3d at 1373. The court also referred to Arrhythmia Research Tech.,
Inc. v. Corozonix Corp., 958 F.2d 1053, 1059 (Fed. Cir. 1992), where the transformation of
electrocardiograph signals from a patient's heartbeat by a machine through a series of
mathematical calculations constituted a practical application of an abstract idea because it
corresponded to a useful, concrete, or tangible thing-the condition of a patient's heart. Cf In re
Bilski, 545 F.3d at 959-60 (discussing that the practical application of the abstract idea
corresponding "to a useful, concrete, or tangible thing," is no longer the proper inquiry into the
patentability of a process; instead, the proper question is whether the claimed process has a
transformative effect).
231. StateSt., 149 F.3dat 1373.
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useful, concrete, and tangible-the final price was "momentarily fixed
for record[ing] and reporting purposes and.., relied upon by
regulatory authorities. 232
Relying on the rationale of State Street, the Federal Circuit, in
233AT&T Corp. v. Excel Communications, Inc., considered whether a
claimed process for creating an indicator useful for billing purposes
23for long distance telephone calls was statutory subject matter. 4 The
patent described a message record for long-distance telephone calls
that is enhanced by adding a primary interexchange carrier (PIC)
indicator. Within the system, Boolean algebraic principles applied to
subscribers' and call recipients' carrier data determined the value of
the data and applied that value through switching and recording
mechanisms. The PIC indicator represents information about the call
recipient's PIC, which the court described as a useful, concrete,
tangible result: the ability of the interexchange carrier's calls to be
differentially billed.235
The court relied upon In re Alapatt and State Street for the
proposition that in order to patent an algorithm, its application must
be useful, and held that, without preempting other uses of the
mathematical principle, AT&T's Boolean principle was employed to
produce a useful, concrete, and tangible result.23 6 In finding the
process transformative, the court also looked to Arrhythmia, where
the claimed process was statutory because the algorithm produced a
number with a specific meaning.2 37 No longer an abstraction, the
Arrhythmia algorithm's use produced a useful, concrete, and tangible
result.
238
232. Id. Cf In re Bilski, 545 F.3d at 960 n.19 (holding that the "useful, concrete, and
tangible result" test should no longer be relied upon).
233. AT&T Corp. v. Excel Commc'ns, Inc., 172 F.3d 1352 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
234. Id. at 1358.
235. Id. However, the "useful, concrete, and tangible result" test for subject matter
patentability is no longer the sufficient inquiry for patentability. See, In re Bilski, 545 F.3d at
960 n.19.
236. AT&T, 172 F.3d at 1357-58 (citing State St., 149 F.3d at1368, 1373; Arrhythmia
Research Tech., Inc. v. Corozonix Corp., 958 F.2d 1053, 1060 (Fed. Cir. 1992) ("That the
product is numerical is not a criterion of whether the claim is directed to statutory subject
matter.")). Cf In re Bilski, 545 F.3d at 960 n.19 ("As a result, those portions of our opinions in
State Street and AT&T relying solely on a 'useful, concrete and tangible result' should no longer
be relied upon.").
237. AT&T, 172 F.3d at 1359.
238. Id. (citing Arrhythmia, 958 F.2d at 1060). Cf In re Bilski, 545 F.3d at 960 n. 19 ("As a
result, those portions of our opinions in State Street and AT&T relying solely on a 'useful,
concrete and tangible result' should no longer be relied upon.").
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The process of DNA "isolation and purification" does not
transform the genetic information, the scientific principles or
formulas of the recited claimed genetic sequences, into a different
state or thing. Despite a potentially "useful, concrete, and tangible
result" produced by isolating and purifying naturally-occurring DNA
molecules, nothing is transformed by the process. Unlike the
transformed underlying data of In re Alapatt, State Street Bank, and
AT&T, the underlying data, i.e., the naturally-occurring sequence
involved in the process, remains identical to the data produced as a
result of the process. In both State Street and AT&T, it is arguable that
with the aid of mathematical equations, simple underlying data and
numerical information become transformed into numerical
information imparting a different value to the information contained
within the original data. Although the claimed isolated, purified, or
replicated DNA sequence has a useful application, the initial data is
identical and useful in a similar way, as instructions to code for
protein. The sequence remains unchanged and untransformed, having
the same essential and inherent value as the original information.
239
Lower courts after Diehr expanded the patentability of
algorithms embedded within process claims, but only when the
process had a similarly transformative result. The 1994 Federal
Circuit case In Re Schrader240 involved a novel method for
conducting auctions comprising a series of steps for "competitively
bidding on a plurality of related items, such as contiguous tracks of
land., 24 1 The court found that the claimed method was a procedure to
determine the best combination of bids.242 In considering the statutory
nature of the claim, Schrader argued that no algorithm was being
claimed.243 The court disagreed, finding that the procedures described
the solution of a mathematical problem.
244
Schrader further argued that despite the presence of the
algorithm, the method transformed bidding data into data that could
be displayed by regrouping raw bids into new groups known as
completions.245 The Federal Circuit, however, found that there were
no physical changes or effects as a result of these regroupings. 246 The
239. See supra Part 1.
240. In re Schrader, 22 F.3d 290 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
241. Id. at 291.
242. Id. at 293.
243. Id.
244. Id. (citing Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 65 (1972)).
245. Id.
246. Id. at 294.
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patent claim was rejected because the bids were not transformed into
a new result, or into a form for display to the bidders.
247
The previously discussed case of In re Warmerdam48 similarly
examined whether the claimed manipulation of data produced a
sufficiently transformative effect to render the claim patentable.249
The court acknowledged that where a claimed process transformed an
article and was more than a simple manipulation of ideas, it could be
considered statutory. 250 However, the court found that the claimed
process did not have the effect of transforming the data into
something different.25'
The informational content of "isolated and purified" genetic
sequences is the result of a process which does not transform the
information into a different state or thing. Like the information
regarding bids in Schrader, the information resulting from the process
of identification, isolation, purification, or replication is not
transformed: it is identical to the information contained within DNA
sequences existing within the natural environment. The manipulation
of the calculations and the data in the Warmerdam case did not
produce something different.252 The isolation, purification and
replication of naturally-occurring DNA similarly results in the
production of identical genetic information. The requisite
transformation for the claimed sequence to be considered statutory
subject matter has not been produced by these processes.
A recent decision from the Federal Circuit, In re Bilski,
253
clarified the scope of patentable process claims. 254 The case
considered whether a business method, where an energy commodity
provider manages (hedges) the price risks and consumption risks in
the energy market without using a computer, is patentable subject
matter.255 The Federal Circuit ordered this appeal of the lower court
decision be heard en banc, and that briefs address specific questions,
including whether a method or process must result in the physical
247. Id.
248. In re Warmerdam, 33 F.3d 1354 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
249. Id. at 1360.
250. Id.
251. Id.
252. Id.
253. In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
254. Id.
255. See id. at 949-50.
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transformation of an article or be tied to a machine in order to
constitute patentable subject matter. 256
The court assessed the validity and usefulness of previous and
alternative tests for determining whether a patented process totally
pre-empts the use of a law of nature, natural phenomenon, or abstract
ideas (referred to by the court as "fundamental principles"), 257 and
found such tests to be inadequate or improper inquiries for
determining whether a claimed process is statutory.258 Among these
was the "useful, concrete and tangible result" language, previously
articulated in Alapatt, State Street, and A T&T.259 The court recognized
that "the Supreme Court has explained that 'certain types of
mathematical subject matter, standing alone, represent nothing more
than abstract ideas until reduced to some type of practical
application. ,260 However, although the court found that this might be
helpful in deciding whether a claim was for a fundamental principle
or its application, the inquiry was insufficient and should not supplant
the Court's test for patent eligibility under § 101.261
The court relied on Benson and Flook to describe essential
elements of the test: "the use of a specific machine or transformation
of an article must impose meaningful limits on the claim's scope to
impart patent eligibility" 262 and "the involvement of the machine or
transformation in the claimed process must not merely be
256. Id. at 949-50.
257. Id. at 952-61 & n.5.
258. What was known as the "Freeman-Walter-Abele" test consisted of two parts: whether
the claimed process contained an "algorithm," as described by the Supreme Court in Benson,
and then determining whether it was applied or tied in any way to "physical elements or process
steps." Because the test both conflicted with the Court's holding in Flook, and because claims
had been upheld which failed the test, the court held that the test was inadequate, and rather,
"the machine-or-transformation test is the applicable test for patent eligible subject matter." Id.
at 958-59. The court similarly dismissed what was known as the "technological arts test,"
finding that because the language and meanings of its terms were "ambiguous and ever-
changing," and because the test had not been expressly articulated by the Court, or the lower
Federal Circuit, they would rely upon the "machine or transformation test as articulated by the
Supreme Court." Id. at 960. Categorical exclusions, such as "business methods," were beyond
the fundamental principles delineated by the Court and were also rejected as exclusions for
patentability. Id. The "physical steps" test was also rejected, the Court stating that "the proper
inquiry under § 101 is not whether the process claim recites sufficient 'physical steps,' but
rather whether the claim meets the machine-or-transformation test." Id. at 961.
259. Id. at 959.
260. Id. (quoting In re Alappat, 33 F.3d 1526, 1543 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (elaborating on
Supreme Court precedent)).
261. Id. at 959.
262. Id. at 961 (citing Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 71-72 (1972)).
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insignificant, extra-solution activity." 263 As the case did not deal with
the implementation of a machine, the court discussed only the
transformation element of the test, clarifying the meaning of "[a]
claimed process is patent eligible if it transforms an article into a
different state or thing.,
264
The court noted that the facts of the case necessitated a
clarification of what constituted an "article" to be transformed.
265
While processes for a chemical or physical transformation of
substances or physical objects were "self-evident," the "raw
materials" of a claimed process in the "information age" are electrical
signals or electronically manipulated data, or in this case, "even more
abstract constructs such as legal obligations, organizational
relationships, and business risks. 266 The court examined the decision
in Abele267 to illustrate how a determination could be made as to
whether these types of claimed processes qualify as transforming or
reducing an article into a different state of thing. 68
In Abele, one claim was directed to a non-statutory process of
"graphically displaying variances of data from average values," where
the type and nature of the data was not specified, and the claim did
not describe where the data came from or what it represented.269
However, a claim which specified that the data was "X-ray
attenuation data" which had been produced in a two-dimensional field
"by a computed tomography scanner" was patentable subject
matter.270 The visual depiction on a display of data representing
physical and tangible objects, bodily organs, bones and tissues,
represented a transformation rendering the process patentable. 271 The
court reiterated that transforming the electrical data into the visual
depiction was sufficient, and that transformation of the physical
object represented by the data was unnecessary for upholding the
claim.27 2 As a result, the basis of the test, as defined by the court, was
"the prevention of pre-emption of fundamental principles" was
satisfied: the process involved a practical application of a
263. Id. at 962 (citing Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 590 (1978)).
264. ld. at 962.
265. Id.
266. Id.
267. In re Abele, 684 F.2d 902 (C.C.P.A. 1982).
268. Bilski, 545 F.3d at 962-63.
269. Id. at 962.
270. Id. at 962-63.
271. Id.
272. Id. at 963.
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fundamental principle which transformed specific data and a
273depiction representing physical objects. Accordingly, the claim's
scope did not wholly pre-empt the use of the principle.
In examining the claimed risk-hedging method in Bilski, the
court noted that abstractions such as legal obligations, relationships,
or business risks could not be "transformed" as they were neither
substances or physical objects or representative of physical substances
or objects.2" As the process was not tied to the use of a machine and
was not transformative, the claim was directed to an abstract idea, its
use a pre-emption of all forms of the idea, and thus non-statutory
subject matter.275
In a statement that could prove significant for a consideration of
the statutory nature of DNA sequences, the court in Bilski noted that
future developments in science could cause the Supreme Court to
alter or abandon the transformation test in order to "accommodate
emerging technologies., 27 6 It is foreseeable that the evolving nature of
the "article" being transformed, such as electronic data or abstract
business methods, will be highly relevant in future cases considering
the pre-emption of fundamental principles by a patent claim. In such a
case involving claims to human DNA sequences, the "article" can be
erroneously and archaically described as simply the isolated and
purified molecule, a physical object or substance, and the claimed
sequence, the specific patterns of As, Ts, Cs, and Gs, simply a
representation of that physical molecule. If this reasoning is followed,
one could consider the claim analogous to the statutory claim of
Abele, the specific representative data transformed into a visual
depiction on a particular screen.
However, in what the court described as "the information
age,, 277 it is important to recognize and regard patent claims for
human DNA sequences as information. In doing so, these claims fail
the machine-or-transformation test. Although the process of isolation
and purification might reduce the molecule itself, the actual claim is
for the sequence which represents the intangible or embodied
information-the formula for the production of proteins. DNA
sequences are more analogous to the abstract relationships of Bilski,
an exchange of potential legal rights to purchase commodities, than
273. Id. (articulating the court's understanding of Supreme Court precedent).
274. Id.
275. Id. at 964-66.
276. Id. at 956.
277. Id. at 962.
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electronic data transformed into a visual image. Similarly, the
molecule itself can be described as simply embodied or materialized
information, the sequence again representative not of a physical
object or substance, but of pure and intangible information, a non-
statutory abstraction. In either case, patents claiming this information
pre-empt the fundamental principle, the pre-existent naturally
occurring information of human DNA.
III. CATEGORIES OF STATUTORY SUBJECT MATTER
In defining statutory subject matter, the Court has recognized
that a patent is granted for a discovery or invention of a means or
method of producing a result, rather than for the result itself.278 A
patent granted to DNA sequences, isolated or otherwise, is a patent
granted to information, which is not within the categories defined by
statute. Additionally, patents claiming genetic sequences which have
been identified, isolated, purified or replicated have been erroneously
granted for a "result" and an "effect" of a process that identifies,
isolates, purifies, or replicates the information in a human genetic
sequence. The sequential information of a human gene is precisely the
scientific explanation of the product being claimed. Thus, these
sequences are not within the four enumerated statutory categories.
Whereas the previously discussed Nuijten case construed the
claimed signal as non-statutory pure information, it also considered
whether the signal was within the four enumerated statutory
279
categories. In evaluating the claim, a technique to improve the
watermarked signal, the Board stated it was not a process, as it did not
recite "acts"; it was not a machine, as it lacked a concrete physical
structure; it was not a composition of matter, as it was "not composed
of matter"; and it was not a manufacture, as it did not have any
physical structure or fit the definition of a manufacture which requires
a tangible object.2 80
In discussing whether the claim constituted any of the statutory
categories, the court first reiterated and clarified the State Street
case. 281 State Street suggested that the question of § 101 patentability
should focus on the essential characteristics of the claim, particularly
278. Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 182 n.7 (1981) (quoting Coming v. Burden, 56 U.S.
(15 How.) 252,267-68 (1854)).
279. In re Nuijten, 500 F.3d 1346, 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
280. Id.
281. Id. at 1353.
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its practical utility, rather than the category of subject matter.282
Nuijten found that the four statutory categories should not be rendered
irrelevant and non-limiting, noting that State Street recognized that
the claimed subject matter must qualify as one of four statutory
categories.283 The dispute in this case was whether the transitory
signal meets the criteria of any statutory category.284
The court examined each statutory category in turn. The court
found that the claimed invention was not a process as it was not "a
series of acts or steps. 285 Nuijten argued that the signal was a process
because the signal had to be encoded using a given encoding process.
The court viewed this as a potential product by process claim,
directed to the ultimate product and not the underlying process.286 The
court stated that the recited steps did not transform a claim for a
thing-the signal itself-into a claim for the process by which it was
made.287 Despite the signal's physicality, the court held that the signal
was not a machine "consisting of parts, or of certain devices and
combination of devices. 288
The court also found that the signals, standing alone, were not
statutory manufactures. 289 The court defined articles of manufacture
as either verbs or nouns: as a verb, "the production of articles for use
from raw or prepared materials by giving to these materials new
forms, qualities, properties, or combinations, whether by hand labor
,,290or by machinery, or, as a noun, articles resulting from the process
of manufacture. 291 The court held that these definitions require
articles, or commodities of manufacture, be tangible. 292 Although the
transmitted signal was man-made and physical, the court regarded its
nature as transient and devoid of any semblance of permanence.
293
282. Id. at 1353-54 (citing State St. Bank & Trust v. Signature Fin. Group, 149 F.3d 1368,
1375 (Fed. Cir. 1998)).
283. Id. at 1354.
284. Id.
285. Id. at 1355.
286. Id. (citing SmithKline Beecham Corp. v. Apotex Corp., 439 F.3d 1312, 1315 (Fed.
Cir. 2006)).
287. Id.
288. Id. at 1355-56 (quoting Burr v. Duryee, 68 U.S. (1. Wall.) 531, 570 (1863)).
289. Id. at 1356-57.
290. Id. at 1356 (quoting Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 308 (1980)).
291. Id. (citing Bayer AG v. Housey Pharms., Inc., 340 F.3d 1367, 1371-72 (Fed. Cir.
2003)).
292. Id
293. Id
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Because the signal was not a tangible article or commodity, it was not
a manufacture as defined by the statute.
The court also concluded that the signal was not a composition
of matter, which the court defined as "all compositions of two or
more substances and all composite articles, whether they be the result
of chemical union, or of mechanical mixture, or whether they be
gases, fluids, [or] powders of solids. 29 4 Thus, after examining all four
categories, the court determined that the signal did not fall within any
295category of patentable subject matter.
In all of the previously discussed claims to isolated DNA
sequences, pure information is the essence of these claims.29 6
Analogous to the signal in Nuijten, they arguably do not fit into any of
the four enumerated categories of statutory subject matter. It is not a
process because it is not a series of acts or steps. Simply calling the
resultant polynucleotide sequence "isolated" "does not transform a
claim covering a thing-the [information] itself-into" a claim that
covers the process for making it.297 Nor is isolated DNA a machine
because it is not a concrete thing consisting of parts or of certain
devices or combination of devices. A claim for a polynucleotide
construed to cover its informational content similarly is not a
manufacture or article resulting from the process of manufacture. The
information comprising an isolated DNA sequence does not have a
new form, use, quality, properties, or combinations of information
differing from the raw material from which it has been extracted.
Analogous to a signal, genetic sequence information is intangible and
thus does not constitute a manufacture according to the statute and the
court.
Furthermore, a claimed polynucleotide sequence is not a
composition of matter. Whether existing in its natural environment or
extracted from that environment, the claimed DNA sequence is not a
composition of two or more substances. Rather, it is simply intangible
or embodied information-the representation or embodiment of a pre-
existent arrangement, as opposed to a newly composed mixture,
union, or combination of chemicals-the sequence coding for the same
amino acids whether inside or outside an individual's body. The
polynucleotide, like the signal, is not a statutory composition of
matter, nor is it a statutory process, manufacture, or machine.
294. Id. at 1357 (quoting Chakrabarty, 447 U. S. at 308).
295. Id.
296. See supra Part 1.
297. See Nuijten, 500 F.3d at 1355.
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A. Non-statutory "printed matter"
Under the "printed matter" doctrine, a mere arrangement of
printed matter by itself is not considered a manufacture and is not
patent eligible subject matter.298 In the computer age, electronic
storage and communication of information is widely used.
Accordingly, "the printed matter rule extend[s] beyond printed
information to information recorded in any medium or substrate., 299 It
is arguable that as "printed matter," patent claims directed to DNA
sequences read on a simple arrangement of numerical information
recorded in an identified molecule and are outside the scope of
statutory subject matter.
Older cases illustrate the doctrine. In the 1931 case of In re
Robert Russell,300 a patent was sought for a novel way of arranging
and grouping names, which facilitated their location in directories and
indexes. 301 Although tangible and novel, the court found the
302arrangement to be printed matter outside the statutory categories.
Similarly, the 1926 case of Guthrie v. Curlett3 0 3 involved an index
that consolidated all railroad tariffs in the country using symbols
representing carriers, terminals, and commodities.304 Although the
court found a compression of information using indices useful, 305 this
was not enough to confer patentability as no new relationship existed
between the printed matter and physical matter.30 6
In Boggs v. Robertson,30 7 a new method for making map
projections was claimed which used geometrical curves for a
particular purpose. 30 8 The court found that the claimed invention was
merely a system of lines which did not refer to any tangible article.30 9
Because there was no dependence between the printed matter and the
298. See In re Miller, 418 F.2d 1392, 1396 (C.C.P.A. 1969); Ex parte Gwinn, 112
U.S.P.Q. 439, 442 (Pat. Off. Bd. App. 1955); In re Jones, 373 F.2d 1007, 1013 (C.C.P.A. 1967)
(quoting In re Sterling, 70 F.2d 910, 912 (C.C.P.A. 1934)).
299. CHISUM, supra note 47, § 1.02[4] (citing In re Lowry, 32 F. 3d 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1994);
In re Jones, 373 F.2d 1007 (C.C.P.A. 1967); Ex Parte Jenny, 130 U.S.P.Q. 318 (Pat. Off. Bd.
App. 1960)).
300. In re Russell, 48 F.2d 668 (C.C.P.A. 1931).
301. Id. at 668.
302. Id. at 668-69.
303. Guthrie v. Curlett, 10 F.2d 725 (2d Cir. 1926)
304. Id. at 726.
305. Id.
306. Id. at 726-27.
307. Boggs v. Robertson, 13 U.S.P.Q. 214 (D.C. 1931).
308. Id. at 214.
309. Id. at 215.
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object on which it was arranged, the court held the invention to be an
idea reduced to writing.310 The surface upon which the projection was
reproduced, or how the projection was affected, was immaterial and
completely lacking in substance.311 The court described the claims as
merely "mental visions" and held that the claim was not a
manufacture. 
3 12
Claims to the sequential informational content, to the
representations of the physical arrangements of chemical bases of
human DNA sequences, are analogous to the non-statutory claims
involved in the printed matter cases. One can consider the polyribose-
phoshodiester backbone of DNA, i.e., the materials which shape the
physical double helix form of a DNA molecule, as a substrate similar
to a blank sheet of paper. The unique nucleotide bases which specify
the genetic code are the letters or indicia of information. The
backbone itself is generic; it does not specify any genetic information
and can accommodate any letters without preference. The blank
substrate is of no particular value as the essence of the subject matter
of a DNA sequence claim.
This recitation of the sequence information in a patent claim is
analogous to a way of arranging and grouping names in an index-the
non-statutory claim in Russell. It is "a mere arrangement of printed
matter," where the substrate is not a sheet of paper or a book, but the
molecule from which the information is derived.3 13 Thus, the claimed
invention should not qualify as one of the four enumerated categories
of statutory subject matter.
As in Guthrie, the "employment of symbols" used to make an
index consolidating tariffs, the subject matter being claimed for
patents on human genetic sequences are symbols for an arrangement
of chemical bases occurring naturally. The metaphor of letters in the
alphabet has been used to describe this information, 314 and today these
representations should also be unsuitable, non-statutory subject
matter. Despite the nomenclature, "isolated and purified" is not what
is described by the claiming party. In the case of Boggs, the use of
geometric curves was considered an abstraction resembling a mental
vision. The erroneously described manufacture lacked material
310. Id.
311. Id.
312. Id.
313. In re Russell, 48 F.2d 668, 669 (C.C.P.A. 1931).
314. See, e.g., Kane, supra note 134, at 754.
2009]
514 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. [Vol. 25
substance.315 Like all cases in the printed matter doctrine, the sole
feature of the alleged novelty is an abstraction, independent of its
316material substrate. Patent claims to identified, isolated, purified,
and replicated genetic information are also allegedly novel, but could
be described as mere abstract ideas reduced to writing or mental
visions. The substrate, the backbone of the molecule, is similarly
irrelevant to the basis of the claim.
As an exception to this traditional rule, claims to printed matter
became patentable if an arrangement involved "a new and useful
feature of physical structure or a new relationship between the printed
matter and the physical structure."'3 17 Cases have been distinguished
where the claimed invention was a physical object which had been
designed in a manner specific to its unique construction and where the
printed matter provided a physical relationship, a "cooperation
between the body and the indicia.
' 318
This exception is illustrated in older cases such as Benjamin
Menu Card v. Rand McNally & Co.3 19 and Cincinnati Traction Co. v.
Pope.320 In the 1894 Benjamin case, a patent was sought for a menu
used in railway cards with two detachable checks on its reverse
side.321 When a check was detached, the menu was mutilated, the
remainder of which was incomplete and useless for another guest.
322
The court held that the combined menu-meal ticket was patentable,
finding that a structure made of cardboard with printed matter upon it
did not render the invention non-statutory.
323
The 1913 Cincinnati case questioned whether a "time limit"
transfer ticket used by street railways and transfer companies that
enabled quick transfer and the monitoring of conductors and
passengers was patentable subject matter.324 The ticket contained the
usual notation but included detachable coupons for morning and
afternoon uses, whereas the earlier method of punching a ticket
315. Boggs, 13 U.S.P.Q. at215.
316. Seeid. at214.
317. CHISUM, supra note 47, § 1.02[4].
318. Boggs, 13 U.S.P.Q. at 215.
319. Benjamin Menu Card v. Rand, McNally & Co., 210 F. 285 (N.D. Ill. 1894).
320. Cincinnati Traction Co. v. Pope, 210 F. 443 (6th Cir. 1913).
321. Benjamin Menu Card, 210 F. 285-86.
322. Id. at 286.
323. Id. at 288.
324. Cincinnati Traction, 210 F. at 444.
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allowed for its fraudulent use.325 The court held that the new ticket
clearly involved a physical structure and that the claim was limited to
that structure.326 Thus, it was deemed a patentable manufacture.327
The court found the distinctive structure of both the body and the
coupon to be accompanied by instructions for use and interpretation
of the ticket. 328 The construction of the transfer ticket did not confine
the specifications of the style, printed arrangement, or its language.
329
The only necessity was that the face of the ticket conveyed the
required information.33°
A more recent 1994 case dealing with computer technology,
In re Lowry,331 also discussed the printed matter doctrine. 332 The
Federal Circuit explained that a computer's memory stores data
according to a particular order or arrangement and that application
programs use this stored data to perform specified functions.3 33 A
framework for organizing and representing this information is called a
"data model," which in turn defines data structures, where an
application program uses organizational structures imposed upon the
data, compatible with particular data processing systems.334 Thus,
these structures are a physical embodiment of a data-organizing
system, often shared by more than one program.3 5 The patent claim
at issue was directed to a data structure that allowed accessibility by
different application programs by optimizing the capacities of two
different data models that were both functionally and structurally
325. Id. at 446, 448 ("Claim 1 reads: 1. A transfer ticket comprising a body portion and a
coupon, said body portion and coupon bearing conventional indications to constitute an
antemeridian transfer ticket when said body portion is used separately and a postmeridian
transfer ticket when used together. . Claim 8 reads: 8. A transfer ticket comprising a body
portion and a coupon and further provided with conventional indications to constitute a
complete transfer ticket for one part of the day when said body portion and coupon are used
together.").
326. id.
327. Id.
328. Id.
329. Id. at 446-47.
330. Id. at 447.
331. In re Lowry, 32 F.3d 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
332. Id.
333. Id. at 1580.
334. Id.
335. Id.
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expressive.336 Thus, the structure allowed for both large and varied
amounts of data to accurately represent complex information.337
Lowry's data structure was comprised of ADOs (Attribute Data
Objects) stored in a memory. ADO's were defined as basic data
elements comprised of sequences of bits stored in the memory as
electric or magnetic signals representing information.338 According to
the claim, these ADOs have interrelationships arranged in both a
hierarchal and non-hierarchical manner and are governed by simple
organizational rules.339 "Because the claimed invention use[d] single
ADOs governed by simple organizational rules, Lowry assert[ed] that
it may flexibly and accurately represent complex objects and
relationships., 340 He claimed that the arrangement facilitated software
operations in the data structure, including the retrieval, addition, and
removal of information. 341 Claims 1-5 claimed "a memory containing
a stored data structure." 342
The court reviewed the Board's determination that the data
structures were analogous to printed matter, and therefore, the ADOs'
specific features were not patentable without a functional relationship
between the printed matter and the substrate.343 The court found,
however, that the cases dealing with printed matter have no relevance
where the claimed invention requires that the information be
processed by a machine, i.e., a computer, and not the human mind.344
Because Lowry's data structures are processed by a machine, the
court concluded that the printed matter cases were irrelevant to the
case at bar.
345
Additionally, the court noted that the data structures were not
analogous to printed matter as the ADOs were not simply underlying
data in a database.346 Instead, the court found that the claims were not
336. Id.
337. Id. (Lowry's structure was based upon a model, "Attributive data model,"
representing complex information in terms of the relationships between attributes, i.e., "the idea
that one thing is attributed to another thing." The model capitalized on the concept of a database
where information was "represented in terms of its characteristics and relationships to other
information," known as attributions.).
338. Id. at 1580-81.
339. Id. at 1581.
340. Id.
341. Id.
342. Id.
343. Id. at 1582.
344. Id. at 1583 (quoting In re Bernhart, 417 F.2d 1395, 1399 (C.C.P.A. 1969)).
345. Id.
346. Id.
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merely for the informational content of the computer's memory, but
rather the structures defined the memory's functional
characteristics. 347 The court explained that the claims required
specific electronic structural elements to "impart a physical
organization on the information stored in memory.' '348 Lowry did not
seek to patent an abstract data model or the informational content
residing in a database. Rather, the claimed data structures "impose[d]
a physical organization on the data." 349 Considering the issue of a lack
of a per se physical structure, the court concluded that if a machine is
programmed in a new and unobvious way, it is physically different
from a machine without the program because the arrangement of its
memory elements is altered.35°
These exceptions to the printed matter doctrine should not be
applicable to patents claiming the sequential information of DNA. In
the case of claims to human genetic material, the process of isolation
and purification is used to identify and reveal the indicia. Consisting
of the information, the sequence is analogous to an arrangement of
symbols representative of the physical object. When this arrangement
of "identifiers" is patented, there is no new physical body
supplemented by indicia which is being claimed. Rather, it is the
indicia itself for which the patent is being sought, and is thus
indistinguishable from non-statutory printed matter claims. Unlike the
menus in Benjamin or the time-limit transfer railway tickets in
Cincinnati, patent claims for the information in a DNA sequence do
not "clearly involve physical structure," nor are the claims "limited to
such structure." 351 There is no new object that is "accompanied by the
conventional indications." 352 The information of a DNA sequence is
the conventional indication, standing alone.
Unlike the data structures and ADOs of Lowry, information
existing within claimed DNA sequence is analogous to the
information stored in a database. Lowry's claims were directed to
more than just the informational content. While the information
content affected the exact sequence of bits stored in the data structure,
the claims required specific electronic structural elements which
imparted a physical organization on the information stored in
347. Id.
348. Id.
349. Id.
350. Id. (quoting In re Bernhart, 417 F.2d 1395, 1400 (C.C.P.A. 1969)).
351. Cincinnati Traction Co. v. Pope, 210 F. 443, 446 (6th Cir. 1913).
352. Id.
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memory. Lowry did not claim the data model in the abstract or the
content of information resident in the database. Even though these
structures were imperceptible, they were more than mere abstractions
or printed matter. Instead they determined how information was to be
managed. In claims for the information in DNA sequences,
identifying, isolating, purifying the information in a DNA molecule
does not impose a new structure which imparts a physical
organization of the information. Rather, it merely reflects or
represents the identical physical organization. Claims to human
genetic sequences are analogous to the distinctions articulated in
Lowry that were attempts to claim the abstract data model and the
informational content of the database. Unlike the data structures in
Lowry, the information of DNA is analogous to printed matter, and
thus non-statutory.
B. Non-Statutory "Mental Steps" or "Mental Processes"
Various explanations have been offered for the mental steps
doctrine, including the concern that patents should not be issued for
processes involving human thought, communication, understanding,
and creativity.353 A line of cases exemplify the doctrine, including
recent cases from the Federal Circuit, which have seemingly revived
the doctrine's use.354
As noted in Benson, mental processes are underlying requisites
for work in science and technology.355 Systems that operate and
depend solely on human intelligence to solve practical problems are
thus unpatentable. 356 Information-processing methods and analytic
processes which are no more than a series of mental steps, or
information-processing steps that could be implemented through the
use of these mental steps, have been deemed non-statutory by the
Patent Office as well as the lower courts.357 These claims recite purely
mental terms such as "determining," "registering," "counting,"
353. Richard S. Gruner, Intangible Inventions: Patentable Subject Matter for an
Information Age, 35 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 355, 400-01 (2002).
354. See, e.g., Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67 (1972); In re Abrams, 188 F.2d 165,
169 (C.C.P.A. 1951); Exparte Read, 123 U.S.P.Q. 446 (Pat. Off. Bd. App. 1943); In re Meyer,
688 F.2d 789, 794-95 (C.C.P.A. 1982); In re Sarkar, 588 F.2d 1330, 1333 (C.C.P.A. 1978); In re
Musgrave, 431 F.2d 882, 889 (C.C.P.A. 1970; In re Comiskey, 554 F.3d 967, 979-80 (Fed. Cir.
2009); In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 952 (Fed. Cir. 2008), petition for cert. filed, 77 U.S.L.W.
3442 (U.S. Jan 28, 2009) (No. 08-964).
355. Benson, 409 U.S. at 67 (quoting Mackay Radio & Tel. Co. v. Radio Corp., 306 U.S.
86, 94 (1939)).
356. In re Comiskey, 554 F.3d at 980.
357. See, e.g., In re Abrams, 188 F.2d at 170.
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"observing," "measuring," "comparing," "recording," and
"computing. 358
Claims for methods and materials (the informational content of
any particular DNA sequence) consisting of a process for determining
the presence or absence of susceptibility to a particular disease or
condition,359 should be considered exceptions to patentable subject
360matter as laws of nature and pre-existing scientific principles. In
addition, the subject matter of such claims should be considered
mental steps or processes, exclusions to the enumerated statutory
categories. These claims are precisely mental activities involving
human "communication, creativity, and understanding. 36'
At issue in Ex parte Read was the patentability of a method for
determining the speed or distance traveled by an aircraft.3 62 Claim 8
recited:
8. The method for determining the rate of travel of a vehicle which
comprises providing two logarithmic scales, starting one of said
scales moving relatively to the other, at a rate which changes in
accordance with the same logarithmic scale, as the vehicle passes
one point of two, the distance between which is known, and as the
vehicle passes the other point reading the time rate on one of said
scales opposite the distance traveled between said points on the
other of said scales.
363
The court found that this correlation between the readings was not a
true manipulative step, but rather a purely mental act.364 The claim
was rejected as it did not constitute a true method.3 65
In the case of In re Meyer,366 the court considered whether a
claimed "process ... for carrying out the process of testing a complex
system and analyzing the results of these tests" was statutory subject
matter.36 7 The human body was described as the "complex system,"
and the "tests" were part of a clinical neurological examination
administered by a physician. 368 The claim noted that in a large number
358. Id. at 169.
359. See supra note 102 (describing this particular type of claim).
360. See supra notes 104-277 and accompanying text.
361. See supra note 353 and accompanying text.
362. Exparte Read, 123 U.S.P.Q. 446, 447 (Pat. Off. Bd. App. 1943).
363. Id. at 446.
364. Id. at 447.
365. Id.
366. In re Meyer, 688 F.2d 789 (C.C.P.A. 1982).
367. Id. at 790.
368. Id. at 790-91.
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of test outcomes, the use of an algorithm to locate probable
functioning and malfunctioning in that system could avoid the
complex task of such a computation. 369 Claim 1 was for steps (a)-(f)
which:
(a) select[ed] a plurality of elements in the complex system...
(b) initializ[ed] a factor associates with each of [those]
elements;
(c) tested the complex system for a response, which response, if
effective, require[d] proper functioning of certain said elements,
the probable identity [sic] of at least some of these certain elements
being known;
(d) determin[ed] whether said response of the complex system
was at least partially effective or ineffective;
(e) modiflied] the factor associated with at least some of said
elements known to be possible [sic] involved in the response in
accordance with the effectiveness of the response; and
(f) repeating steps (c), (d), and (e) for further responses of the
complex system to obtain resultant factors for at least some of said
elements,
whereby said resultant factors are indicative of probable
malfunction of their associated elements and thereby indicative of
probable malfunction at the locations of these elements. 370
In assessing the claim, the court noted that the testing was simply
a gathering of data, which was insufficient to render the claim
statutory.37' Step (d) provided information read into a computer, and
the comparison process of step (e) took place in the computer by a
process in which test outcomes were compared with stored data.
372
The addition of factors and repetition of the computing was not a
process for producing a product, such as the process in Diehr. Rather
it was an attempt to patent a mathematical algorithm.373
The court noted that "some mathematical algorithms and
formulae do not represent scientific principles or laws of nature; they
represent ideas or mental processes and are simply logical vehicles for
communicating possible solutions to complex problems. 3 74 The
369. Id. at 791.
370. Id. at 792-93.
371. Id. at 794 (citing In re Richmond, 563 F.2d 1026, 1030 (C.C.P.A. 1977)).
372. Id.
373. Id.
374. Id. at 794-95.
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invention, in part, employed a computer to replace the thought
processes of a neurologist. The court addressed "whether [the] mental
process is applied to [statutory] physical elements or process steps.,
375
Construing the claim broadly, the court held that the appellants
claimed a mathematical algorithm. It simply represented a mental
process that had not been applied to statutory physical elements or
process steps and is not within the categories of patentable subject
matter.376
In the case of In re Sarkar,377 the court examined whether a
method of "mathematically modeling an open channel" was a
statutory process. 378 The claimed system could "accurately provid[e]
the flow parameters ... over a period time, even though it (1)
contains obstructions . . . , (2) experience[d] flooding, (3) ha[d] a
lateral inflow, (4) ha[d] actual inflow at its upstream end, and (5)
emptied into a tidal body. ' 379 The ability to account for these
situations was asserted to be the advancement, the improvement over
the prior art, claimed by the invention.380 Claim 1 involved a series of
steps using repeated mathematical equations:
[Step] (a) measur[ed] the cross-sectional dimensions of the
channel at a specificially chosen, predetermined number of
locations usable for schematizing said dimensions into a
rectangularized cross-section for each regularly spaced but
arbitrarily chosen distance Ax along the length of the channel
irrespective of the chosen value of the interval of time At;
Step (b) recite[d] the mathematical equations used to define the
open channel flow. Steps (c)-(g) recite[d] additional data-gathering
steps, and step (h) recite[d] the method of solving the flow
equations using the collected data of steps (a) and (c)-(g).3
8 1
The Board rejected all of the claims, concluding that they were
not directed to a statutory process.38 2 Step (a) was considered an
older, common step to establish values for variables in equations and,
375. Id. at 795-96.
376. Id. at 796.
377. In re Sarkar, 588 F.2d 1330 (C.C.P.A. 1978).
378. Id
379. Id. at 1331.
380. Id.
381. Id.
382. Id.
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if patented, would pre-empt all meaningful uses of the recited
formulas.383
Considering whether the measuring step (a) established that the
invention as a whole was an application of the algorithm, not simply
the algorithm itself, the court noted that a number of claims have been
considered to be unpatentable mental steps, as they involve
disembodied thoughts rather than tangible embodiments of ideas in
the technological arts.384 Continuing, the court stated that the human
mind is capable of mental processes such as mathematical exercises
or calculations. Although often represented as algorithms, formulas,
symbols, or equations, these mathematical thought processes remain
disembodied and are therefore not within the categories of patentable
subject matter.385
The court disagreed with Sarkar's proposition that his invention
was an inventive application of the algorithm.3 86 Instead, the court
explained that a mathematical equation cannot be used without
"establishing and substituting values" for its variables.387 This
substitution of values has been viewed as a type of mathematical step.
If the sole steps of gathering and substituting values were sufficient,
every algorithm, mathematical equation, or formula with a practical
use would be a patentable process. The substitution of specific values
used to convert the ideas in the formula into an application of the
formula is non-statutory. 388 The court concluded that as a whole,
Sarkar's claimed invention is a mathematical exercise where a new
formula is provided; values that have been dictated by the formula are
gathered and substituted for the formula's variables, and the formula's
calculations are made. 389 The claim was rejected by the court as a
390
non-statutory process.
The previously discussed patent on a method of identifying an
individual at risk for having a genetic predisposition to developing
breast cancer is analogous to cases determining particular processes
or methods to be non-statutory "mental processes" or "mental
383. Id. at 1332 (citing In re Christensen, 478 F.2d 1392, 1394 (C.C.P.A. 1973)).
384. Id. at 1333 (citing In re Waldbaum, 457 F.2d 997, 1003 (C.C.P.A. 1972)).
385. Id.
386. See id. at 1335-56.
387. Id. at 1335
388. See id (citing In re Chatfield, 545 F.2d 152, 158 (C.C.P.A. 1976)).
389. Id. at 1336.
390. Id.
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steps. '391 Akin to reading the scales in Ex parte Read, the patent
requires reading the information produced by similar data gathering
and calculations, and determining susceptibility to breast or ovarian
cancer based upon the presence or absence of a genetic variation.
Like the neurological tests in Meyer, the identification of a
persons' DNA sequence by amplifying the fragment (using an
oligonucleotide primer which hybridizes to a sequence within the
gene) and repeating these sequencing processes are simply steps to
gather data.392  The machine's comparison process in Meyer
recognized the "malfunction probabilities for all elements of a
complex system," in other words, neurological problems within an
individual's human body. This is analogous to a geneticist or
physician determining that the presence or absence of a particular
polymorphic variation represents the "malfunction probabilities" of a
particular genetic variation which might similarly produce problems
within a person's body.
The correlation involved in the patent for breast cancer
susceptibility, like the computer process of Meyer, is analogous to a
mathematical algorithm, a scientific formula, rather than a process
which produces a product as in Diehr.393 Instead of replacing the
"thinking processes of a neurologist with a computer,"394 the claimed
genetic information patent excludes the thought processes of any
physician, researcher, geneticist, scientist or individual who wishes to
make a similar determination by examining data and recognizing that
such a correlation exists. Like the claimed algorithm in Meyer, these
claims are directed to a non-statutory mental process which is not tied
or applied to either physical elements or process steps, and is thus not
within any of the four enumerated statutory categories.
395
As in Sarkar, the gathering of information involved in
sequencing an individual's DNA to establish the existence of a
susceptibility to a particular genetic condition is analogous to the
similarly described steps of establishing values for an equation's
variables used to effectively model an open channel.396 Determining
that a correlation exists by comparing the information gathered via
391. See supra notes 89-92 and accompanying text (discussing a specific example of this
type of claim).
392. In re Meyer, 688 F.2d 789, 794 (C.C.P.A. 1982) (explaining that the testing step is
merely a step to gather data).
393. Id. (citing Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175 (1981)).
394. Id. at 795.
395. Id. at 796.
396. In re Sarkar, 588 F.2d 1330, 1333 (C.C.P.A. 1978).
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DNA sequencing is similarly a disembodied exercise within the range
of human mental processes.
A line of cases has clarified the mental steps doctrine.397 In a
398
rehearing of a previous decision, In re Prater, the court examined
the mental steps doctrine in the context of considering whether a
particular method claim constituted patentable subject matter. 399 "The
invention include[d] both a method and apparatus for the processing,
or analysis, of conventionally obtained spectrographic data to produce
a quantitative spectrographic analysis of a qualitatively-known
mixture, for example a mixture of gases, by which the unknown
component concentrations maybe determined with minimum of
error."
400
Prior to the claimed invention, the raw data was obtained in a
spectrogram at a "continuous trace having a plurality of peaks., 40 A
subset of equations was applied to the data to solve for the
concentrations to produce a quantitative analysis. 402 The description
of the invention noted:
(1) that the different subsets of equations result in varying degrees
of undesired "error amplification" in transforming the
spectrographic data involving peak heights to the desired
concentrations; (2) that there exists a certain relationship indicative
of such error amplification; (3) that that relationship is related to,
and may be expressed in terms of, the determinants of subsets of
the equation, the determinant of largest magnitude indicating the
subset of equations involving the least error amplification.
40 3
Prior to the claimed invention, no systematic method or means existed
to select the subset of equations that would generate the least error
amplification.40 4 Additionally, the applicants disclosed a detailed,
mechanical machine to carry out the invention. They noted that this
was one device capable of performing the functions and that a general
purpose computer could also be used.40 5
397. See, e.g., In re Abrams, 188 F.2d 165 (C.C.P.A. 1951); In re Meyer, 688 F.2d; In re
Sarkar, 588 F.2d; In re Musgrave, 431 F.2d 882 (C.C.P.A. 1970).
398. In re Prater, 415 F.2d 1378 (C.C.P.A. 1968), rev'd in part on reh'g, 415 F.2d 1393
(C.C.P.A. 1969).
399. In re Prater, 415 F.2d 1393 (C.C.P.A. 1969).
400. Id. at 1395.
401. Id.
402. Id. at 1395-96.
403. Id.
404. Id.
405. Id. at 1396-97.
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The Board rejected claims 1, 6-9, 12, and 17-21 because the
method did not set forth anything which could not be performed
purely as a mental exercise, 40 6 and also determined that Claim 10 was
an "apparatus counterpart" to the non-patentable method.40 7 The
appellants sought to assert that the mental steps rule should not apply
by noting that in previous cases, no machine or apparatus had been
disclosed for automatically carrying out the invention without human
intervention. 408 This rationale precluded "the process or any part
thereof from being considered purely mental., 40 9 The court agreed
with the appellants, distinguishing their method claim from the one in
Abrams, where the teachings of an application could only be
performed in the mind, and Yuan, where the claimed invention was an
operator's interpretation of results performed in his mind with the use
of equations, pencil and paper.41 0
Further delineating the mental steps doctrine in footnotes, the
court explained that purely mental steps "may only be performed in,
or with the aid of, the human mind."'4 ' Physical steps "may only be
performed by physical means, machinery, or apparatus., 41 2 Noting
their differences, specifically that mental steps were less susceptible
to specific definition, the court described a spectrum whereby an
infinite variety of steps could be employed in between either purely
mental or purely physical means including "comparing" or
"determining. '" 4 13 The court stated that to determine which end of the
spectrum is nearer, each case, considering all of the surrounding
circumstances, must be decided on its own facts.414 Regarding the
particular issue in the case, the court stated "it would appear that the
disclosure of apparatus for performing the process wholly without
human intervention merely shows that the disclosed process does not
fall within the so-called 'mental steps' exclusion. ' 415
406. Id. at 1395, 1398.
407. Id. at 1399.
408. Id. at 1400.
409. Id. at 1400.
410. Id. (discussing In re Abrams, 188 F.2d 165 (C.C.P.A. 1951); In re Yuan, 188 F.2d
377 (C.C.P.A. 1951)).
411. Id. at 1402 n.22.
412. Id.
413. Id.
414. Id.
415. Id.
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The court, in In re Musgrave,416 discussed the mental steps
doctrine when deciding whether a claimed process for obtaining
seismograms which delineated the nature of the subsurface formations
in the earth's crust was a statutory process. 4 17 The claimed invention
for a "new" seismogram was accomplished by identifying and
eliminating "multiples." Caused by reflections of seismic waves,
multiples were the "unwanted signals which needed to be eliminated
to avoid errors in measurements of the time-occurrence of
reflections. 4 18 The court found the discovery to consist of techniques
to identify and eliminate the multiples when they could be separated
from reflections and the "magnitude of errors in the normal move-out
corrections [could] be determined."4 19 Thus, it was possible for
multiples to be removed from the seismograms. 420 In order to employ
the techniques, the seismograms must be reproduced
phonographically on a magnetic, photographic, or other reproducible
medium. 42 1 This technique was necessary as the refinement of the
seismograms involved a repetition of recording and playing back the
signals which represented the seismic waves.422
The Board rejected the claims as they included no physical steps
and set forth only a method of processing data that did not require any
tangible device.4 23 The Board found that corrections applied in steps 2
and 3 of Claim 2 resulted from the human judgment implicit in step 1,
where the signals generated at detecting stations were a necessary step
that required compilation of data from two sources.4 24 The Board also
found that step 3, where these corrections had to be further
"interpolated," was likewise an act requiring human judgment, and
step 6 merely applied corrections to the data and required no physical
act.
425
The Board concluded that the claim and its steps covered non-
statutory subject matter.426 What distinguished these claims from
conventional methods of seismic exploration was the use of every
416. In re Musgrave, 431 F.2d 882 (C.C.P.A. 1970).
417. In re Musgrave, 431 F.2d at 882, 888.
418. Id. at 884.
419. Id.
420. Id.
421. Id.
422. Id.
423. See id at 886.
424. See id. at 887.
425. Id. at 887-88.
426. Id. at 885.
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possible procedure, including mere mental processing of the data, for
applying correction data to experimental data.427 They similarly
rejected Claim 60 as a method for processing data which did not
specify or require using an apparatus or employing physical acts on
physical things.428 Accordingly, the Board considered the method, a
series of conceptual steps, a non-statutory algorithm. 29
Differing from the Board's interpretation, the court discussed
how the concept of "purely mental" should be interpreted, noting that
the correct construction should "encompass only steps incapable of
being performed by a machine or apparatus., 430 In a footnote, the
court discussed what "particularly human activities" involved,
including the following description:
None of the steps involve peculiarly human mental activities which
cannot, in principle, be performed by devices. None of them
involve aesthetic, emotional, imaginative, or creative thought or
reactions on the part of the practitioners (operators). None of them
involve human "value judgments"-that is, judgments on human
conduct, ethics, morals, economics, politics, law, aesthetics, etc.
431
In considering whether the claims involved purely mental steps,
the court examined a number of Board reversals of "mental steps"
rejections.432 In Ex Parte Moser,433 while stating that determining a
relationship between viscosity and the Conradson carbon of cattle
feed was in essence a mental process, the continual measuring of the
feed's viscosity into a machine was not a wholly mental step.434 In Ex
Parte McNabb,435 a multi-step method of locating defects in wooden
objects such as telephone poles by radiographic methods, which
included physical manipulations based upon observations, did not
involve "purely mental or interpretative mental steps. ' '436 In Ex parte
Kahn,437 the Board considered whether a method of insect control,
where insects were selectively attracted according to species, was
427. Id. at 888.
428. Id.
429. Id. at 886, 888.
430. Id. at 889-90.
431. Id. at 890 n.4 (quoting Robert Coulter, The Field of the Statutory Useful Arts, 34 J.
PAT. OFF. Soc'Y. 417, 426 (1952)).
432. Id. at 891.
433. Ex Parte Moser, 124 U.S.P.Q. 454 (Pat. Off. Bd. App. 1959).
434. Id. at 455.
435. Ex Parte McNabb, 127 U.S.P.Q. 456 (Pat. Off. Bd. App. 1959).
436. Id. at 457-58.
437. Ex Parte Kahn, 124 U.S.P.Q. 511 (Pat. Off. Bd. App. 1959).
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non-statutory subject matter according to the "mental steps"
exclusion.438 The sound of a female insect was recorded while she
was feeding around sunrise and sunset.439 The signal was then
modified by amplifying the high-frequency component. The marked
portions of the modified signal were rerecorded and reproduced in
front of the live insects to be controlled.440 The Board found that the
captive insects indicated the parts of the record attractive to them and
selected for those insects; the operator observed this fact and marked
the record.441 The Board found that while the operator should think
while observing whether the record was attracting the captive insects,
the claimed steps did not involve such thought and thus did not
describe the claims as mental processes.442
In Musgrave, the court was not concerned with the Board's
conclusions regarding the non-statutory nature of individual steps 2
and 3 of Claim 2. The court was only concerned with whether the
combined steps which constituted the claimed process were statutory,
finding that both claims 2 and 60 basically involve manipulating
certain "signals" to achieve an improved record of seismic events.44 3
The court reasoned that these claimed processes were not non-
statutory mental processes simply because some or all of the steps
could also be carried out in the human mind or because the
performance of the process required thought.44 4 The only requirement
to make a series of steps a statutory process is that it be within the
technological arts.445
Distinguishable from the claims in Prater and Musgrave are
patent claims on methods and materials for identifying individuals
having an allele of their BRCA1 gene with a BRCA coding sequence
not associated with breast or ovarian cancer, and determining that this
data is correlated with an absence of a genetic susceptibility to the
disease. A process which, to date, can only be performed in the
human mind.446 Although techniques to gather and compare such
biological data are presently automated using sequencing/microarray
technology in conjunction with a computer-implemented comparison
438. Id. at 512.
439. Id.
440. Id.
441. Id. at 514.
442. Id.
443. In re Musgrave, 431 F.2d 882,893 (C.C.P.A. 1970).
444. Id.
445. Id. (citing U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8).
446. See supra note 103 and accompanying text.
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and a statistical analysis of the collected data, it is arguable that these
physical steps, machines, and apparatuses do not recognize and
understand the implications of the existing statistical "correlation."
This is highly distinguishable from the correlation which has occurred
in the mind of the individual reading the statistical data. Moreover, in
examining the spectrum to determine whether a step is physical or
mental, considering the specific circumstances of the patent claims to
these genetic correlations leads to a further distinction that invokes
the mental steps exclusion. In Prater, a machine or a computer could
employ a mathematical formula to refine seismograms and determine
"an unknown component concentration" with a "minimum of error"
where the machine, apparatus, or computer is producing the
determination.447 In the case of patents on methods for identifying
genetic relationships, it is the thought itself, i.e. a determination which
is being patented. The recognition of the disembodied sequence
information representing the correlation is made, not by a machine,
apparatus, or computer, but by the mental step of anyone recognizing
what the information represents.
The patenting of this genetic information, the assertion that
certain bits of sequence information is determinative of, identifies, or
correlates to the presence or absence of an increased susceptibility to
a certain disease, is also distinguishable from the court's holding and
analysis in Musgrave. Attempting to define the concept of "purely
mental," the court in Musgrave noted that it involved "particularly
,,448human activities. Any recognition of a genetic correlation (by an
"operator" or otherwise) is an activity involving aesthetic,
imaginative and creative thought-albeit scientific (it is a scientific
judgment, an "etc." similarly referred to in the Musgrave analysis).449
Patents on genetic correlations similarly are distinguishable from
the cases cited by Musgrave whose claims were not considered
"mental steps." In Ex Parte Moser, the court was not satisfied that
recognizing the viscosity of the feed using a machine was a wholly
mental step.45°
In the claim for a method of identifying individuals with or
without a susceptibility to breast or ovarian cancer, it is the
recognition of the relationship, i.e., a mental process that is patented.
447. In re Prater, 415 F.2d 1393, 1395, 1398 (C.C.P.A. 1969).
448. In re Musgrave, 431 F.2d at 889-90 n.4 (citing Coulter, supra note 431 at 426).
449. Id.
450. Ex Parte Moser, 124 U.S.P.Q. 454,455 (Pat. Off. Bd. App. 1959).
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The previously claimed method, involving the sequences of BRCA
genes, states that steps in the method are;
e) determining the presence or absence of each of the polymorphic
variations in said individual's BRCA1 coding sequence ....
f) determining any sequence differences between said individual's
BRCA1 coding sequences and SEQ. ID. NO: 1 wherein the
presence of any of the said polymorphic variations and the absence
of a polymorphism outside of positions 2201, 2430, 2731, 3232,
3667, 4427, and 4956, is correlated with an absence of increased
genetic susceptibility to breast or ovarian cancer resulting from a
BRCA1 mutation in the BRCA1 coding sequence.
451
The determination based upon an analysis and comparison of the
sequenced genetic data, unlike the physical manipulations based upon
observations in Ex parte McNabb, is a purely mental or an
interpretive mental step.
The methods and materials of the patented DNA correlation
claims go beyond the observation and markings in the insect control
case of Ex parte Kahn, where no further interpretative skill or
knowledge was required beyond recording and counting the actions of
the insects. Rather, the claimed methods for patenting pre-existing
genetic relationships involve a mental recognition of the significance
of the relationship, the scientific determination, or even possibly, an
aesthetic judgment that a correlation exists. 452
Claims to the information involved in these correlations
transcend the "mere thought" rule of Kahn, as relied upon in
Musgrave. Not only is an operator not "merely thinking" in making
these correlations, his actual thought, i.e., the determination or
451. U.S. Patent No. 5,654,155 col. 65 1. 60-col. 66 1. 53 (filed Feb. 12, 1996).
452. In fact, the assertion that the determination of the correlation is, in essence, a type of
aesthetic judgment subject to different interpretations is illustrated by Denise Caruso:
[A] consortium of scientists publishing findings that challenge the traditional
view of how genes function. The exhaustive four-year effort was organized by
the United States National Human Genome Research Institute and carried out by
35 groups from 80 organizations around the world. To their surprise, researchers
found that the human genome might be a "tidy collection of independent genes"
after all, with each sequence of DNA linked to a single function, such as a
predisposition to diabetes and heart disease.
Instead genes appear to operate in a complex network, and interact and
overlap with one another and with other components in ways not yet fully
understood. According to the Institute, these findings will challenge scientists to
"rethink some long held views about what genes are and what they do."
Denise Caruso, A Challenge to Gene Theory, a Tougher Look at Biotech, N.Y. TIMES, July 1,
2007, at 3, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/07/01/business/yourmoney/01 frame.html?_r= 1.
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recognition itself is the object being claimed. Despite its' useful status
within the technological arts, unlike the process for obtaining
seismograms, patents on methods for determining genetic correlations
for disease susceptibilities are "mental steps" and thus excluded from
the categories of statutory subject matter.
A recent Federal Circuit case, In re Comiskey,453 signals a revival
of the doctrine, where the court considered whether a claim for "a
method and system for mandatory arbitration involving legal
documents, such as wills and contracts[,] ... require[ing] resolution
by binding arbitration of any challenge or complaint concerning any
unilateral document ... [or] contractual document" was statutory
subject matter.454 The court stated that:
Although the application's written description references "an
automated system and method for requiring resolution through
binding arbitration" and "a mandatory arbitration system through a
computer on a network," claims 1 and 32 do not reference, and the
parties agree that these claims do not require, the use of a
mechanical device such as a computer.
455
The court noted that standing alone, human thought processes,
even if they have a practical application, are non-statutory (citing
Flook for the proposition that even if used to solve a particular
problem, if as a whole it covers methods for calculating with the use
of a mathematical formula, the method is non-statutory).45 6 The court
established that neither claim 1 nor 32 required a machine or
described a process of manufacture or a process for the alteration of a
composition of matter, but rather claimed "the mental process of
resolving a legal dispute between two parties by the decision of a
human arbitrator" by conducting arbitration resolution for a contested
issue and determining an award or decision for the contested issue,
through a pre-determined arbitration system.4 57 Comparing the claims
to the unpatentable algorithms found in Benson and Flook, the court
found the claims in the case non-statutory as they sought "to patent
the use of human intelligence in and of itself.,
45 8
453. In re Comiskey, 499 F. 3d 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
454. Id. at 1368.
455. Id. at 1369.
456. Id. at 1378 (citing Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 595 (1978)).
457. Id. at 1379.
458. Id.
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In re Bilski similarly revives the "mental processes" doctrine.459
A claim was described as "a method of hedging risk in the field of
commodities trading, 46° and the claimed process allowed the
transactions to involve options for buying and selling, "not limited to
transactions involving actual commodities. 46'
The court concluded that, just as the claims in Comisky were for
mental processes involved in arbitrating a dispute, the claimed
process in Bilski was, as a whole, "directed to the mental and
mathematical process of identifying transactions that would hedge
risk., 462 These mental processes involve making calculations without
requiring a computer or other device, mentally identifying the risk-
reducing transactions and adding the post solution step of achieving
the transaction.463 A patent would pre-empt all applications of
"hedging," even if confined to consumable commodities.464 Thus, the
claim was not drawn to patent eligible subject matter under § 101.465
A claim for a method which correlates genetic sequences to
underlying medical conditions is analogous to the arbitration method
of Comiskey and the risk-hedging method of Bilski. It similarly claims
"a process of human thinking" which, when "standing alone, is not
patentable even if the resulting claim has a practical application. '' 66
The claim of identifying individuals as being susceptible or not to a
certain medical condition (i.e., possessing a particular genotype), by
comparing data is essentially directed to a method of calculation and
implementation of a formula. The process of identifying individuals
having genetic susceptibilities does not require a machine for the
comparison of the information, nor does it describe a process for the
alteration of a composition of matter. Although the DNA fragment is
"amplified" and sequenced, the process does not alter, transform, or
reduce the information obtained by the process which merely
identifies and extricates information rather than changing or altering
an individual's DNA fragment. Indeed, if the process altered the
information, the process itself would be unreliable. Cancers could
either go undetected (false negatives) or be misdiagnosed (false
459. In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943 (Fed. Cir. 2008), petition for cert. filed, 77 U.S.L.W. 3442
(U.S. Jan 28, 2009) (No. 08-964).
460. Id. at 949.
461. Id. at 950.
462. Id. at 965.
463. Id.
464. Id. at 965-66.
465. Id. at 966.
466. In re Comiskey, 499 F.3d 1365, 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
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positives) as a result of the isolated genetic information not faithfully
representing the nucleotide sequence in the patient's genome.
Like the non-statutory algorithms of Benson and Flook, and the
methods described in Comiskey and Bilski, claims to determinations
or correlations, involving comparisons to the underlying data, the
information of an individual's DNA fragment and a lack of
polymorphic variation within that data, are similarly claims to the use
of human intelligence in and of itself and constitute non-statutory
mental steps.
IV. RECENT DEVELOPMENTS REGARDING THE SCOPE OF STATUTORY
SUBJECT MATTER
Diamond v. Diehr was the last Supreme Court case to issue an
opinion regarding the scope of statutory subject matter.467 In 2005,
however, the dissent in Labcorp v. Metabolite468 raised the question of
the scope of § 101 in considering whether a physician's correlation of
elevated levels of homocysteine (an amino acid existing in the human
body) to a deficiency of vitamin B, was a stated exception to
patentable subject matter, a claim to a law of nature, natural
phenomenon, or abstract idea.469 Not having been raised by the lower
courts, the question was left undecided on procedural grounds.
470
Although the Court did not consider issues specific to computers
or biotechnology, it is arguable that the dissenting opinion, stating
that the question should have been decided and discussing the
substantive issue, influenced the Nuijten, Comisky, and Bilski
decisions, the first cases to address patentable subject matter
following Metabolite. Their outcomes echo the rationales set forth in
Justice Breyer's dissent.
The patentee in Metabolite argued that in Claim 13, the assaying,
or testing step involved in making the correlation between the level of
homocysteine in the blood and a vitamin B deficiency, was a
transformative step.47' Justice Breyer disagreed, arguing that the step
did not transform the blood or any other matter, nor was the step
inventive, as it could be done with any available test.472 He also
467. Phillip McGarrigle & Vern Norviel, Laws of Nature and the Business of
Biotechnology, 24 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 275,286 (2008).
468. Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings v. Metabolite Lab., Inc., 548 U.S. 124 (2006).
469. Seeid at 132.
470. Id. at 132.
471. Id. at 134-35.
472. Id. at 136.
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addressed the "concrete, tangible, and useful result" test of State
Street, noting that the Court never authorized this particular standard,
and, "if taken literally, the statement would cover instances where this
Court has held to the contrary. 473 The dissent argued that the
correlation was merely a natural process, a law of nature, mental
steps, or processes-an instruction for physicians to compare numbers
illustrative of an underlying and pre-existing scientific principle.474
Thus, the dissent considered the underlying principle an abstract,
intangible idea-a conclusion similar to those reached regarding the
signal in Nu~jten, or the non-statutory mental processes of the claims
in Comiskey and Bilski.
Despite the Court's refusal to consider the case, the significance
of the questions it raised as voiced by the dissent, suggested the need
for clarification regarding the scope of patentable subject matter. A
letter regarding such clarification was issued by the Commissioner of
Patents, relying on former Supreme Court precedents and recent
Federal Circuit decisions.475 The Commissioner's letter stated that for
a process to be considered statutory (i.e., falling within one of the four
enumerated categories of § 101) it had to " (1) be tied to another
statutory class (such as a particular apparatus) or (2) transform
underlying subject matter (such as an article or materials) to a
different state or thing.' 476 An example was provided to illustrate a
method or process which would not qualify as statutory: "a claim that
recited purely mental steps. 477 A patentable claim should positively
recite the other statutory class (thing or product) to which it is tied
(such as identifying the apparatus that accomplished the steps of the
method) or positively identify the subject matter that is being
transformed. 478 Finally, the letter noted that the Interim Guidelines for
patentable subject matter would be revised based upon the outcomes
of numerous pending cases on appeal at the Federal Circuit (such as
In re Bilski), noting that the issue of subject matter patentability was
evolving.479
These developments all have implications for claims to the
information of isolated and purified DNA sequences, as well as
claims to methods that include such sequences, especially if construed
473. Id.
474. Id. at 136.
475. See Memorandum from John Love, supra note 55.
476. Id.
477. Id.
478. Id.
479. Id.
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as reading on the informational content of the sequence. Clarified as
pertaining to claims to intangible or embodied information, they are
exceptions to patentable subject matter, analogous to the pre-existing,
although recently discovered relationship between levels of
homocysteine and vitamin B in a human body discussed in
Metabolite. As previously discussed, a DNA sequence additionally
falls outside the enumerated categories of statutory subject matter like
Nui'ten's signal, or a sequence correlation to a genetic susceptibility,
analogous to the methods in Comiskey and In re Bilski, all of which
represent important precedents in considering the patentability of
human DNA.
Similar to the clarifications issued by the Patent Office which
described the requirements for a process to be considered statutory
subject matter, later confirmed in Bilski, claims involving the
information of isolated and purified DNA sequences are not tied to
any other statutory class, such as a particular apparatus. Nor is any
underlying subject matter, such as an article or material transformed
to a "different state or thing." These recent cases and developments
within the USPTO therefore suggest the possibility that, should cases
be brought regarding the statutory nature of DNA sequences or
correlations between a claimed sequence and susceptibility to a
medical condition, they would not meet the requirements to be
considered patentable subject matter.
CONCLUSION
A specific and accurate characterization of what is actually being
claimed is imperative in cases involving statutory subject matter.
Examining the biological nature of DNA and the precise language of
claims involving these sequences reveal that the only purpose or
rationale underlying attempts to patent DNA sequences is to gain the
exclusive use and control of the informational content, the
disembodied information existing within, or embodied as, a molecular
structure. Considering the statute, cases, and regulations governing
the scope of statutory subject matter existing over the last 100 years,
it should be recognized that human genetic material should not be
considered patentable subject matter.
Instead, examining the precise scientific nature of DNA and
DNA sequences defines these claims as simply covering information,
intangible or embodied within a molecular structure. Described as
"isolated" or "isolated and purified" sequences, they are simply,
whether naturally occurring or existing outside the body, instructions
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for protein synthesis, analogous to algorithms involved in the
workings of computer technology. As such, they exemplify specific
exceptions to patentable subject matter as laws of nature or pre-
existing scientific principles or truths. The Supreme Court and the
Federal Circuit expanded the scope of statutory subject matter in
cases dealing with computer technology, where mathematical
principles or algorithms were applied in a manner which transformed
an underlying object into a different state or thing. The information in
human DNA is not similarly transformed by the technical processes
of "isolation and purification." Thus DNA sequences should be held
non-statutory laws of nature.
Not only do such sequences exemplify the laws of nature
exception to statutory subject matter, they also do not fall within any
of the four enumerated categories of patentable subject matter.
Additionally, DNA sequences represent non-statutory printed manner,
and are also subject to the "mental steps" doctrine, seemingly revived
in In re Comiskey 480 and In re Bilski.481 Correctly construed as claims
to the intangible or embodied information of human DNA sequences,
when considering the law governing patentable subject matter, claims
to this human genetic material should be found non-statutory.
It is possible, however, that the Patent Office and the lower
courts might retain their archaic characterization of the nature of
human DNA as simply a static chemical, or an erroneously described
"composition of matter," allowing for the continuing granting of
patents on this information.482 If this practice persists in the age of
global biotechnology, DNA would continue to exist as commercially
invaluable information when patented.483
This recognition of the true nature of claimed DNA sequences
necessarily raises serious public policy questions. When a patent has
been granted on the exclusive use of genetic information, the ability
to use the information has been removed from the public domain.
This practice arguably undermines the Constitutional objective to
promote "the progress of science., 484 Whether the exclusive use of
this information provides more benefits or harms has been extensively
discussed and debated in the literature.485 This is, however, irrelevant
480. In re Comiskey, 499 F.3d 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
481. In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
482. See, e.g., supra notes 9-13 and accompanying text.
483. See, e.g., GLOBAL GENOME, supra note 6; RAJAN, supra note 7.
484. See U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl.8.
485. See, e.g., Lori B. Andrews, The Gene Patent Dilemma: Balancing Commercial
Incentives with Health Needs, 2 HOUST. L. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 65 (2002); Rebecca S.
NON-STATUTORY NATURE OF DNA
to the narrow question of whether or not the removal of this
knowledge from the public domain is legal under the authority of the
patent statute, as interpreted by the Supreme Court, the Federal
Circuit, and the lower courts.
Due to the nature of patent litigation, the specific question
regarding subject matter eligibility has little likelihood of being
raised.486 As one commentator has noted, patent examiners at the
USPTO have few explicit grounds for rejecting a patent under § 101.
The issue of statutory subject matter is rarely noticed.487 In actions for
patent infringement in the federal district courts, the accused infringer
can formally allege that the patent is invalid "on the basis of lack of
patentable subject matter," or "the court [can] take notice[, sua
sponte,] of the possible relevance of the issue to the litigation., 488
However, a study of litigated patent cases revealed that only 0.7% of
the invalidated patents in the study were found invalid for falling
outside of § 101 constraints. 489 There are a variety of explanations for
this statistic, including the parties' potential unfamiliarity with the
patentable subject matter doctrine, and that patent disputes often arise
between similarly situated competitors who do not dispute the
patenability of the subject matter.490
If the issue of DNA sequences as statutory subject matter is not
addressed during patent examinations or litigation, this vital
information's removal from the public domain, and the potential for
its use, will continue. Aside from the issues discussed in this article,
different grounds for challenging such patents might also emerge,
including the constitutionality of removing information from the
public domain. As an example, it is arguable that First Amendment
concerns of denying access to information and restricting the freedom
of thought are raised by the grant of these patents. Nevertheless, the
protections of the Court might not recognize and legitimize the
characterization of DNA sequences as information: an explicit
Eisenberg, Proprietary Rights and the Norms of Science in Biotechnology Research, 97 YALE
L.J. 177 (1987).
486. See Eileen M. Kane, Patent Ineligibility: Maintaining a Scientific Public Domain, 80
ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 519, 520 (2006).
487. Id. at 553.
488. Id. at 527.
489. Id. (citing John R. Allison & Mark A. Lemley, Empirical Evidence on the Validity of
Litigated Patents, 26 AIPLA Q.J. 185, 208 tbl.l (1998) (presenting data on the grounds for
invalidity most frequently cited in their study of patent litigation)). The number stands in
contrast to other statutory grounds such as novelty, 35 U.S.C. § 102 (2000), or obviousness, 35
U.S.C. § 103 (2000).
490. Id. at 528-29.
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exception to patentable subject matter as laws of nature, and outside
the scope of the enumerated statutory categories. If this occurs, we
will continue to rely upon social scientists and historians to consider
the implications of privatizing the information and knowledge known
as the genetic code.
